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Abstract
Using German establishment-level data, this paper analyses whether wages
respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis is given
to the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies with collective
bargaining coverage. In this context, two conflicting hypotheses are tested.
The first one asserts that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm-
level and appropriate a larger share of rents than the bargaining parties in
uncovered firms. The second one states that unions favour a compressed
intra-industry wage structure and suppress the responsiveness of wages to
firm-specific profitability conditions. The empirical analysis provides strong
support for the second hypothesis. While pooled OLS estimates yield positive
estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments, dynamic
panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endo-
geneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.
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1 Introduction
The question of whether wages vary systematically with firms’ ability-to-pay has long
been of considerable interest to labour economists. In the literature, various theoret-
ical explanations have been advanced for a positive relationship between wages and
profits (see e.g. Blanchflower et al. 1996, Hildreth and Oswald 1997). Apart from
temporary frictions and efficiency wages, a frequently invoked explanation refers to
union power. Under collective bargaining, workers’ remuneration may be expected
to increase with profits, as unions will be able to appropriate part of the industry-
or firm-specific rents. Whether wages react to industry- or firm-specific conditions
should naturally depend on the level of bargaining. Intuitively, wages ought to be
most responsive to firm-specific profitability conditions if wage determination allows
for some adjustment to local conditions at the firm-level.
Although the bargaining structure appears to be an important determinant for
the degree of rent-sharing at the firm- or industry-level, there is surprisingly little
empirical evidence on this topic. While the question of whether wages vary system-
atically with profits has spawned a vast empirical literature (see e.g. Abowd and
Lemieux 1993, van Reenen 1996, Arai 2003, Budd et al. 2005)1, few studies ex-
plicitly address the role of the bargaining structure for rent-sharing. One exception
is the study of Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991), who analyse this question based
on a cross-country comparison. The authors find countries with highly centralised
and coordinated bargaining institutions to exhibit less industry-level rent-sharing
than countries with relatively decentralised bargaining systems. In this paper, we
draw on establishment-level data from Germany and present some new evidence on
rent-sharing and collective bargaining by exploiting intra-national variations in the
bargaining structure. Clearly, such variations offer the advantage of controlling for a
large part of the unobserved heterogeneity in institutional conditions characterising
cross-country comparisons.
The German institutional environment provides a useful example for the coexis-
1 Further studies include Christofides and Oswald (1992), Blanchflower et al. (1996),
Hildreth and Oswald (1997), Abowd et al. (1999), Margolis and Salvanes (2001), Kramarz
(2003) and Dobbelaere (2004) amongst others. There are only few previous studies on the
relationship between wages and profits in Germany: Hu¨bler and Ko¨nig (1998) and Klodt
(2000) use data from the ’Hannover establishment panel’ and report a significant positive
impact of profits on average firm wages.
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tence of different bargaining structures. Until the early 1990s, wage determination
was dominated by centralised wage bargaining between industry-specific unions and
employers’ associations. Those industry agreements were embedded in a corporatist
environment characterised by a high degree of coordination (Soskice 1990). How-
ever, in the last decade, there has been a strong tendency towards decentralisation
of wage determination, since firm-specific collective wage agreements as well as wage
determination without any bargaining coverage have become more and more impor-
tant (Hassel 1999, Ochel 2005). Even within centralised industry agreements, there
have been numerous attempts to allow for more (downward) flexibility of wages by
introducing opt-out and hardship clauses. Moreover, since bargained wages in cen-
tralised agreements merely represent a lower bound for wages, there is also sufficient
room for upward flexibility.
Given this intra-national variation in German wage determination regimes, the
principal aim of this paper is to shed light on the following questions: Do firm-
specific contracts and flexibility provisions in centralised industry agreements allow
for rent-sharing at the firm-level? If yes, does the extent of rent-sharing differ from
that in firms without any bargaining coverage? A striking feature of the German
wage determination process is that decentralisation in collective wage determination
merely refers to the level of bargaining and not to the degree of coordination. The
reason is that - as will be discussed below - collective wage determination at the
firm-level is generally influenced by industry-wide unions which may retain control
over centralised union objectives. Bargaining power considerations lead us to expect
the extent of rent-sharing to be the larger the more coordinated the wage-setting
process and the more decentralised the level of wage determination. Thus, the first
hypothesis to be tested is that unions are able to skim off an even larger part of
rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The question of whether this
notion may be confirmed empirically is of considerable interest in an institutional
environment such as the German one, which has long been pointed out as corporatist
with little scope for excessive rent-sharing at the firm-level. On the other hand, there
are various reasons for why unions might favour a compressed intra-industry wage
structure, such as high transaction costs or workers’ demand for income insurance
(see Agell and Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995, Agell 2002). Therefore, a countervailing
hypothesis to be tested is that unions suppress any inter-firm wage dispersion due
to heterogeneous firm performance.
2
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We investigate the relationship between wages and profitability using the IAB
Establishment Panel. This data set is particularly useful for our purposes as it pro-
vides detailed information on whether an establishment is subject to an industry-
wide wage agreement, a firm-specific wage agreement or to no wage agreement at
all. In our estimation strategy, we first focus on simple static pooled Ordinary
Least Squares (POLS) estimates. The OLS estimations serve as a benchmark case
and will be modified by using dynamic panel data methods. First, we will address
the possibility of unobserved firm-specific time invariant factors. A second prob-
lem concerns the endogeneity of our profitability measure, since wages and profits
are simultaneously determined. Third, we will consider dynamic specifications to
allow for possible dynamics in the response of wages to profitability conditions. Fi-
nally, we will investigate whether our results are robust to sample selection and the
endogeneity of the bargaining structure.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the institutional background
of German wage determination is presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides a
theoretical discussion to derive testable hypotheses about the extent of rent-sharing
under the different wage-setting regimes. These hypotheses are tested in Section 4.
While Section 4.1. presents the general empirical model, Section 4.2. describes the
data set and the main variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.3. reports
the estimation results. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the results. Finally,
Section 6 provides a discussion and some conclusions.
2 Institutional Background
In Germany, basically three forms of wage determination may be distinguished:
central collective wage agreements, firm-specific collective wage agreements as well
as wage determination without any collective bargaining coverage. Until the early
1990s, wage determination was dominated by central regional and industry-wide
collective wage agreements (Fla¨chentarifvertra¨ge). Such central wage agreements
are negotiated between an industry-specific trade union and an employers’ associ-
ation. They are legally binding on all member firms of the respective employers’
association and on all employees who are members of the trade union. Although
the negotiated wage applies strictly speaking only to union members, member firms
3
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generally extend the wage settlement to non-member employees as well.2
Since the early 1990s, the German system of wage determination has experienced
a considerable decline in the importance of centralised collective wage agreements
(see e.g. Hassel 1999, Kohaut and Schnabel 2003). The tendency towards more
decentralisation is caused by three major developments. First, firm-specific collective
wage agreements have become more frequent. Those agreements are negotiated
between an individual firm and a union. A noteworthy feature of those agreements is
that they are concluded by industry-specific unions and do not involve uncoordinated
wage bargaining of independent firm-specific unions. That is, decentralisation here
merely refers to the level of bargaining and not to the degree of coordination. Second,
wage determination without any bargaining coverage is becoming more relevant.
In firms that are not covered by a collective agreement wage determination may
either take the form of individual wage contracts or of plant-specific agreements
(Betriebsvereinbarungen) between works councils and the management.3 In contrast
to firm-specific collective wage agreements, this kind of wage determination can
be characterised as decentralised and uncoordinated. Third, there is a tendency
even within centralised wage agreements to allow for more flexibility at the firm-
level. In recent years, contractual opt-out clauses or hardship clauses have become
a widespread element of central agreements. While opt-out clauses delegate issues
that are usually specified in the central agreement, such as working-time and pay-
conditions, to the plant-level, hardship clauses enable firms to be exempted from the
centralised agreement if they are close to bankruptcy. In general, the adoption of
such clauses requires the approval of the collective bargaining parties (Hassel 1999,
Ochel 2005). Moreover, bargained wages in centralised agreements merely represent
a lower bound for wages, so that there is always sufficient room for upward flexibility.
Even though the wage drift is part of the local negotiations between works councils
and the firm, it is also likely to be coordinated by the centralised bargaining parties.
2 The reason is that non-unionised employees who would receive a lower wage may be
expected to join the union anyway in order to benefit from the higher union wage. In ad-
dition, central wage agreements may also apply to non-member firms and their employees
if the agreement is declared to be generally binding by the Federal Ministry of Labour.
3 According to the German Works Constitution Act, works councils are not allowed to
negotiate about issues that are normally dealt with in collective agreements, even in firms
that are not parties of a collective agreement. In practice, however, works councils may
be expected to play a crucial role in wage determination (see e.g. Hassel 1999, Hu¨bler and
Jirjahn 2003).
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The reason is that union density among works councils members is very high (Hassel
1999), and this is particularly relevant for covered firms. Thus, similar to firm-
specific collective contracts, the adoption of flexibility provisions in centralised wage
agreements is still coordinated by the centralised bargaining parties and involves
merely a decentralisation of the level of bargaining.
3 Theoretical Considerations
The purpose of the present section is to derive testable hypotheses about the degree
of rent-sharing under the different wage determination regimes. The institutional
discussion in Section 2 has yielded two important insights. First, collective contracts
do by no means provide an obstacle to adjust wages to local conditions at the firm-
level, since recent decentralisation tendencies in Germany have introduced - at least
formally - the possibility for such adjustments. Second, even if collective wage
determination takes place at the firm-level, it is still influenced by industry-wide
unions which may retain control over centralised union objectives.
Thus far, the theoretical literature has mainly focused on the effects of different
bargaining regimes on the overall wage level (see e.g. Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Sos-
kice 1990, Dowrick 1993). There is little theory to guide us on the expected effects
on the returns to firm-specific attributes such as profits. The rent-sharing literature
generally predicts a pay-performance link that depends on the relative bargaining
strength of the bargaining parties (e.g. Abowd and Lemieux 1993, Blanchflower et
al. 1996, van Reenen 1996). Such considerations lead us to expect the sensitivity of
wages to firm-specific profits to be larger under firm-specific contracts than in uncov-
ered firms. An important argument is that firm-specific contracts in Germany are
concluded by industry-specific unions, whose bargaining power is likely to be con-
siderably higher than that of works councils determining wages in uncovered firms.
This argument is re-enforced by the fact that the wage bargaining process under
firm-specific contracts is highly coordinated by an industry-wide union, whereas it
is completely uncoordinated in uncovered firms. The bargaining parties in uncov-
ered firms therefore have an incentive to cut wages in order to gain a larger share
of industry-demand, and this restricts their ability to raise wages in response to
more favourable profitability conditions. With an industry union, this competitive
mechanism completely disappears, since a central union may coordinate wage deter-
5
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mination at the industry-level.4 For this reason, one might expect an industry union
to capture a larger share of rents under firm-specific contracts than works-councils
or individuals in uncovered firms.
The extent of rent-sharing under centralised contracts ultimately depends on
whether the bargaining parties make use of flexibility provisions. If such provisions
are exploited, the extent of rent-sharing should be larger under industry-contracts
than in uncovered firms. The argument here is similar to the reasoning for firm-
specific contracts, since the institutional discussion has shown that any adjustment
to local conditions at the firm-level is still highly coordinated by the centralised
bargaining parties. At this point, it is worthy to note that the question of whether
flexibility provisions are used to adjust wages to local profitability conditions still
remains to be answered empirically. For example, even though contractual opt-
out and hardship clauses have become an important (formal) element of centralised
agreements, empirical evidence on the use of such clauses is rather scarce.
Note, in this context, that there are various reasons for why unions (and pos-
sibly employers) might favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure. First,
transaction costs that are incurred when adjusting wages to firm-level profitability
may be high and outweigh any gain involved with wage differentiation. Second,
a further rationale for unions to maintain a compressed wage structure might be
workers’ demand for income insurance (see Agell and Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995,
Agell 2002). In our context, intra-industry wage compression provides insurance
against two dimensions of uncertainties. First, wage compression between firms at
a given point in time may reduce income risk if workers face uncertainties over the
allocation to more or less profitable firms. Second, with a compressed intra-industry
wage structure wage growth is likely to depend on average sector performance, so
that workers’ wages at a given employer should also be sheltered against fluctua-
tions in firm-level profitability over time.5 Thus, the countervailing hypothesis to be
tested is that unions suppress inter-firm wage dispersion due to heterogeneous firm
performance.
4 We have formalised this argument elsewhere (Guertzgen 2005).
5 The issue of wage insurance at the firm level has been taken up recently by Guiso
et al. (2005) and Cardoso and Portela (2005). However, these empirical studies do not
distinguish different bargaining regimes.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Empirical Model and Testable Hypotheses
In order to quantify the relationship between firm-specific profitability and wages
across different wage-setting regimes, we impose a wage equation taking the basic
form
wit = α+ βpi · piit + γ · x′it + δ · s′it + fi + uit. (1)
Since we will use establishment level panel data, all variables are subscripted
by a establishment-index i and a time index t. The dependent variable, w, is the
establishment-specific average wage per worker. The explanatory variable of main
interest is pi, measuring establishment-specific per-capita profitability.6 Following
the majority of the rent-sharing literature (see e.g. see Abowd and Lemieux 1993,
van Reenen 1996), profitability, pi, is measured by per-capita quasi-rents. We choose
quasi-rents - defined as value-added minus the opportunity cost of labour - for two
reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective quasi-rents may be interpreted as
representing the ’pie’ to be divided between the bargaining parties. Second, from
an econometric perspective, the use of quasi-rents instead of profits enables us to
circumvent the endogeneity problem induced by the accounting relationship between
wages and profits.
In eq. (1), x′ represents a (column) vector of further establishment characteristics
with a coefficient vector γ, while s′ denotes a vector of industry characteristics with
a coefficient vector δ. For s′ we include the average sectoral wage as well as industry
dummies. The latter are supposed to capture industry-specific factors, such as the
overall level of industry demand and the degree of competition. The vector of
establishment-specific characteristics, x′, includes among other variables dummies
for the three wage-setting regimes since the bargaining regime is likely to affect
not only the extent of rent-sharing but also the overall wage level. Moreover, x′
contains shares of different skill groups and shares of female workers to control for
establishment-specific compositions of the workforce. To account for unobserved
differences in worker quality and differences in technologies, further explanatory
6Particularly in case of multi-plant firms, one might object that firm-level profitability
provides a more appropriate measure than establishment-level profitability. However, since
we do only have access to the establishment-level measures, those are taken as a proxy for
firm-level profitability.
7
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variables include firm size and the capital-labour ratio. Establishment-specific fixed
effects fi are added to eq. (1) in order to capture unobserved time-invariant factors.
Finally, time dummies are included to capture common macroeconomic shocks, and
uit is a serially uncorrelated white-noise error term.
Since the emphasis of our analysis is on the impact of different wage-setting
regimes on the sensitivity of wages to local profitability conditions, the rent coeffi-
cient βpi is specified to depend on the wage-setting regime:
βpi = β0 + βpi CENT · CENTit + βpi DECENT ·DECENTit, (2)
where CENT is a dummy taking the value of unity if an establishment adopts a
centralised collective wage agreement and DECENT takes on the value of unity if a
firm is party to a firm-specific collective wage contract. Recall that according to our
first hypothesis, βpi DECENT and βpi CENT should be positive, if firm-specific contracts
and flexibility provisions are used to adjust wages to local firm performance. Con-
versely, testing βpi CENT = −β0 (and βpi DECENT = −β0) provides a direct test of the
second hypothesis, according to which unions enforce a compressed intra-industry
wage structure.
4.2 Data and Variable Description
The empirical analysis uses data from the IAB Establishment Panel. This data set is
based on an annual survey of West-German establishments administered since 1993.
Eastern German establishments entered the panel in 1996. The data base is a rep-
resentative sample of German establishments employing at least one employee who
pays social security contributions. The survey data provide numerous information
on establishment structure and performance, as for example the aggregate wagebill,
sales, size and composition of the workforce (see e.g. Bellmann et al. 2002). More-
over, the data contain information on whether an establishment is covered by an
industry-wide collective wage agreement, a firm-specific wage agreement or by no
collective agreement at all.
In our analysis we use data for the years 1995 to 2002, since detailed information
on bargaining coverage is available only from 1995 onwards. Because information
on a number of variables, as e.g. sales and the share of materials in total sales are
gathered retrospectively for the preceding year, we lose information on the last year.
8
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Moreover, we restrict our sample to mining and manufacturing establishments with
at least two employees. We focus on these sectors, since the introduction of opt-out
and hardship clauses has been particularly relevant in central collective wage agree-
ments of these industries. These sectors therefore provide a particularly interesting
case for testing the empirical relevance of the use of such clauses. As we will apply
dynamic panel data methods, only establishments with consistent information on
the variables of interest and at least four consecutive time series observations are
included in our sample. This results in a sample of 661 establishments with 3,411
observations, yielding an unbalanced panel containing establishment observations
with, on average, 5.16 years of data.7
The variables used in the subsequent empirical analysis are defined as follows.
The dependent variable, w, is defined as the annual aggregate wagebill divided by
the number of employees. The number of employees and the wagebill are reported
for the month June, where the wagebill is defined exclusive of employers’ mandatory
social security contributions as well as fringe benefits. Per capita quasi-rents are
constructed as the difference between annual sales, material costs and the alternative
annual wagebill divided by establishment size, so that
pi =
SALES −MATERIALCOST − w · SIZE
SIZE
. (3)
Establishment size (SIZE) is calculated as the reported number of employees
averaged over the present and preceding year. The alternative wagebill, w · SIZE,
is defined as the annual wagebill which each establishment would incur if it had to
pay the average industrial wage. Thus, we approximate w by the weighted average
of industry-specific annual wages (separately for East and West Germany) for blue-
and white-collar workers with the weights being the establishment-specific shares of
those worker groups in the total work force.8 All monetary values are expressed as
7 Originally, the sample includes 3,546 establishments with consistent information on
all the variables of interest. 21 observations were dropped due to suspected errors in
the establishment size variable. These observations featured per-capita values of rents
of above 1 million DM. For the same reason, 81 observations with a per-capita wagebill
of below 8,000 DM were discarded from the sample. This results in a sample of 3,515
establishments with a total of 8,617 observations. Only 661 establishments feature at
least four consecutive time-series observations.
8 We convert average hourly industrial wages of blue collar workers into monthly wages
by multiplying them with establishment-specific average working time. Since information
on average sectoral wages of white-collar workers is available only on a monthly basis, we
9
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real values by deflating them with a sector-specific producer price index normalised
to 1 in 2000. Industry-specific price indices and wages are obtained from the Federal
Statistical Office Germany and are matched to the establishment data on the basis
of a two-digit sector classification.
Further variables include the share of high-skilled workers (defined as skilled
white-collar workers), the share of skilled blue-collar workers, the share of female
workers and the share of apprentices in the total work force. Because we do not
directly observe the capital stock, we need to construct a proxy. We measure capital
by using the perpetual inventory method starting from the capital value in the first
observation year and using the information on expansion investment in the following
years. The initial capital value is proxied by dividing investment expenditures in
each establishment’s first observation year by a pre-period growth rate of invest-
ment, g, and a depreciation rate of capital, δ.9 Capital-stocks in subsequent periods
are calculated by adding real expansion investment expenditures.10 To obtain real
values, nominal investment expenditures are deflated by the producer price index
of investment goods of the Federal Statistical Office Germany. The capital-labour
ratio, K/L, is constructed by dividing the resulting capital proxy by establishment
size. An ownership dummy variable indicates whether the establishment is part of
a company owned by persons with unlimited liabilities.
Table 1 presents sample statistics for the main variables used in the subsequent
analysis. The figures disclose that quasi-rents vary considerably more than average
wages. With respect to collective bargaining coverage, the fraction of observations
covered by an industry-wide wage agreement amounts to about 62 per cent, while
the fraction of observations with a firm-specific agreement is only 11 per cent. 27 per
cent of all observations are subject to no agreement at all. Breaking down the sam-
ple into those establishments adopting an industry-wide agreement, a firm-specific
are not able to adjust those wages for establishment-specific average working time. As with
the dependent variable, monthly values are converted into annual values by multiplying
them with the factor 12.
9 This involves the assumption that investment expenditures on capital have grown at
a constant average rate, g, so that the capital stock in the base year is K1 = I0 + (1 −
δ)I−1 + (1− δ)2I−2 + ... = I1
∑∞
s=0[
1−δ
1+g ]
s = I1/(δ + g). In particular, to calculate K1, we
set δ = 0.1 and g = 0.05 (see Hempell 2005).
10 More specifically, Kt = Kt−1(1 − δ) + It−1 = Kt−1 + EIt−1,where Kt is the capital
stock at the beginning of period t, i.e. at the end of period t− 1, and EIt are expansion
investment expenditures in period t.
10
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agreement and into those without any bargaining coverage reveals that average wages
are highest under industry-wide agreements and lowest without bargaining coverage
(see Table A2a in the Appendix). The variability in wages is higher in uncovered
establishments with a coefficient of variation of 0.46 as compared to 0.32 and 0.33
in covered establishments. Moreover, establishments under centralised agreements
outperform those under firm-specific contracts and those without bargaining cov-
erage in terms of per-capita quasi-rents. Establishments adopting industry-wide
agreements also have more employees and exhibit the largest fraction of high-skilled
workers, while establishments without bargaining coverage employ on average more
women than those covered by a collective wage agreement. Finally, establishments
with firm-specific contracts feature the largest capital-labour ratio.
Variable Definition Mean Std.-Dev. Obs.
w Per-capita wagebill 49.74 18.84 3,411
pi Per-capita quasi-rents 70.57 94.59 3,411
w Alternative wage 51.19 11.57 3,411
HIGHSHARE Share of skilled white-collar workers 0.25 0.20 3,411
BLUESHARE Share of skilled blue-collar workers 0.42 0.23 3,411
APPSHARE Share of apprentices 0.05 0.06 3,411
FEMSHARE Share of female workers 0.27 0.21 3,411
SIZE Establishment size 605.80 2505.35 3,411
CENT Centralised collective agreement 0.62 0.49 3,411
DECENT Firm-specific collective agreement 0.11 0.32 3,411
WCOUNCIL Works council 0.64 0.48 3,411
K/L Capital-labour ratio 249.94 1344.08 3,411
EAST Eastern Germany 0.42 0.49 3,411
OWN Private ownership 0.21 0.41 3,411
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1995-2002.
Note: All monetary values are measured in 1,000 DM. 1 e corresponds to 1.95583 DM.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Estimation Strategy
We first focus on a simple static pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) specifi-
cation of eq. (1). The POLS estimations serve as a benchmark case and will be
modified in various respects: first, we will address the possibility of unobserved
establishment-specific time invariant factors. In our context, the presence of unob-
11
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served heterogeneity may result from neglected capital costs in the rent measure as
well as from differences in technological conditions11 and worker quality that are
not captured by our control variables. As such unobserved factors are likely to be
correlated with our profitability measure, simple POLS estimates may be expected
to yield biased estimates of βpi. A second problem concerns the endogeneity of per-
capita rents. A first source of bias is a standard simultaneity bias which occurs if
wages, output and quasi-rents are jointly determined. In general, the direction of
bias can go either way and largely depends on the underlying relationship between
output and employment (see Abowd and Lemieux 1993). In addition, because al-
ternative wages and establishment wages are likely to be positively correlated, there
will always be some source of downward bias. Third, we will consider more dynamic
specifications and will include lagged wages and rents as explaining variables in our
wage regression. The inclusion of lagged rent measures and lagged wages is meant
to allow for possible dynamics in the reaction of wages to profitability conditions
and sluggish adjustment of wages.
4.3.2 Pooled OLS-Results
Table 2 reports results from POLS estimations of the impact of quasi-rents per
worker on wages. The variables are specified in levels rather than logs, since the use
of logs would have required discarding all observations with negative quasi-rents.
The estimate of quasi-rents per employee on the average wage is 0.042 when in-
cluding only the alternative wage in the regression. Adding worker characteristics
reduces the coefficient to 0.036, suggesting that around 14 per cent of the correlation
between rents and wages is due to systematic sorting of workers across establish-
ments (Model (2)). In particular, high-qualified workers appear to be associated
with more profitable establishments. The effects of rents on wages are further re-
duced when including other establishment characteristics, such as establishment size,
bargaining coverage, the existence of a works council and ownership status (Model
(3)). Apart from APPSHARE (fraction of apprentices), the capital-labour ratio
K/L and DECENT , all control variables enter the regression with their expected
11 With respect to differences in technologies, establishment-specific fixed effects capture
e.g. production processes that provide firms with higher rents and which may require com-
pensating wage differentials (e.g. processes involving dangerous work). Such differences
might lead to a positive wage-rent correlation which would not be due to rent-sharing (see
e.g. Margolis and Salvanes 2001).
12
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sign and are all significant at conventional levels. Establishment size is found to
have a significant positive effect on average wages, a result which is consistent with
earlier evidence.12 In the literature, various explanations have been advanced for
a positive relationship between firm size and wages, such as differences in profits,
capital equipment, worker quality and monitoring costs among others (e.g. Oi and
Idson 1999). As we control explicitly for differences in the work force composi-
tion, the capital-labour ratio and quasi-rents, the establishment size variable may
be interpreted as capturing some part of unobserved worker quality and technology
differences.
In Model (4), including industry and time dummies leaves the coefficient on
rents largely unchanged. Adding industry and time dummies changes the coefficient
on the capital-labour ratio to its expected sign, indicating some systematic differ-
ences in capital-intensities across industries. Including an east-west dummy does
not change the coefficient on rents either (Model (5)). As far as the bargaining
coverage effects are concerned, the coefficients on centralised contracts are always
significantly positive, whereas decentralised contracts seem to have no significant
impact on wages. In addition to the collective bargaining regime, we control for the
existence of a works council. Those are found to exert a positive impact on averages
wages, which is also in line with earlier studies (see e.g. Addison et al. 2001, Hu¨bler
and Jirjahn 2003).
Finally, our main interest concerns the question whether the rent-coefficient dif-
fers systematically across the three wage-setting structures. Model (6) includes
interactions between collective bargaining coverage and quasi-rents. The inclusion
of interactions leads to a larger and more precise estimate of the coefficient on
the dummy for firm-level agreements (DECENT ). In sum, the results indicate
that the extent to which wages react to local profitability conditions is significantly
lower in establishments that are covered by a collective wage agreement. Even in
establishments covered by a firm-specific contract wages appear to be less sensi-
tive to rents. Moreover, the adoption of a centralised wage agreement seems to
reduce the magnitude of rent-sharing to a slightly larger extent, as a Wald-Test of
βpi CENT = βpi DECENT can be rejected at the 10 per cent level (with a p−value of
0.078). However, the null hypotheses of β0 = −βpi CENT and β0 = −βpi DECENT
12 For German evidence on employer size effects see e.g. Schmidt and Zimmermann
(1991) and Gerlach and Hu¨bler (1998).
13
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
pi 0.042∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
pi∗ CENT -0.042∗∗∗
(0.010)
pi∗ DECENT -0.030∗∗∗
(0.012)
w 0.992∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.065) (0.064)
HIGHSHARE 11.484∗∗∗ 7.420∗∗∗ 6.727∗∗∗ 10.179∗∗∗ 9.952∗∗∗
(1.721) (1.572) (1.644) (1.953) (1.923)
BLUESHARE 1.433 2.206∗∗ 4.308∗∗∗ 4.862∗∗∗ 4.830∗∗∗
(1.207) (1.098) (1.117) (1.146) (1.148)
APPSHARE -3.183 3.392 7.628∗∗ 1.841 1.980
(3.626) (3.215) (3.525) (3.922) (3.901)
FEMSHARE -17.374∗∗∗ -14.990∗∗∗ -15.339∗∗∗ -15.484∗∗∗ -15.370∗∗∗
(1.225) (1.107) (1.250) (1.245) (1.233)
SIZE 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
SIZE2 -2.17e−08∗ -3.03e−08∗∗∗ -2.94e−08∗∗ -2.91e−08∗∗
(1.19e−08) (1.16e−08) (1.17e−08) (1.18e−08)
CENT 3.772∗∗∗ 4.045∗∗∗ 3.692∗∗∗ 5.619∗∗∗
(0.613) (0.628) (0.635) (0.700)
DECENT 0.671 1.195 1.046 2.058∗∗
(0.754) (0.745) (0.744) (0.886)
WCOUNCIL 7.149∗∗∗ 7.401∗∗∗ 7.116∗∗∗ 7.033∗∗∗
(0.632) (0.631) (0.632) (0.627)
K/L -6.57e−06 0.0002∗ 0.0002 0.0002
(-9.55e−05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
OWN -4.108∗∗∗ -4.267∗∗∗ -4.225∗∗∗ -4.189∗∗∗
(0.535) (0.539) (0.534) (0.534)
EAST -2.849∗∗∗ -2.803∗∗∗
(0.995) (0.988)
Ind.-/Time No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.482 0.522 0.597 0.610 0.610 0.615
Observations 3,411 3,411 3,411 3,411 3,411 3,411
Establishments 661 661 661 661 661 661
Note: The dependent variable is the aggregate per-capita wagebill. Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Models (4) - (6) include time dummies
and 15 industry dummies.
∗Significant at 10%-level ∗∗ Significant at 5%-level ∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level.
Table 2: Pooled OLS regression results
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are also rejected (with p−values close to zero), suggesting that the overall impact
of rents on wages is still positive under both regimes.
4.3.3 Dynamic Specifications
This section addresses potential econometric problems, such as the possibility of
unobserved establishment-specific time invariant factors as well as the endogeneity
of rents. A further possible endogenous regressor is firm size, as higher wages are
likely to induce firms to reduce their labour force. To allow for sluggish adjustment
of wages and time lags in the response of wages to profitability conditions, we add
lagged wages and quasi-rents as explanatory variables to our regression. The wage
equation then takes the following form
wit = α + βwwit−1 +
K∑
k=0
βpit−k · piit−k + γ · x′it + δ · s′it + fi + uit, (4)
where the coefficients βpit−k are specified as in eq. (2). First differencing eq.
(4) eliminates time-invariant establishment-specific effects.13 In eq. (4), first differ-
encing causes the lagged dependent variable ∆wit−1 to become correlated with the
error term ∆uit, so that it is necessary to instrument lagged wages. In the absence
of second-order correlation in the error term, wit−2 and earlier lags will provide suit-
able instruments, since they will be uncorrelated with ∆uit. Because rents, their
interactions with the wage-setting regimes and establishment size are likely to be
endogenous, they are to be instrumented as well. As with the lagged dependent
variable, suitable candidates are lagged rents and establishment size in t − 2 and
earlier provided they do not enter eq. (4) as explanatory variables. Since this might
be particularly relevant for lagged rents, we test for the significance of rents up to
t− 2.
To estimate eq. (4), we first apply the differenced Generalized Methods of Mo-
ments (GMM) estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This esti-
mator exploits all available moment conditions around the error term as specified
13 First-differenced estimates of specification (6) in Table 2 yield rent-coefficients of
0.025, -0.034 and -0.018 with standard errors of 0.013, 0.015 and 0.014 (for no-coverage,
interactions with centralised contracts and firm-specific contracts, respectively), suggesting
a considerable upward bias of the POLS estimates. For the sake of expositional brevity,
we do not report the full first-differenced specifications. The estimates are available on
request.
15
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above. Apart from instrumenting endogenous and lagged dependent variables by
their lagged values in t− 2, the GMM estimator provides an appropriate treatment
of predetermined variables which are assumed to be uncorrelated with uit and uit+1,
but are correlated with uit−1. As first differencing causes such variables to become
correlated with the error term ∆uit, they are instrumented by lagged values in t− 1
and earlier. In particular, we allow all human capital variables, the capital-labour
ratio and the alternative wage to be predetermined in order to capture potential
feedback effects from wages in period t on those covariates in subsequent periods.
To test the validity of the moment conditions, we present the Sargan/Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions. This test statistic calculates the correlation of the er-
ror terms with the instrument matrix and has an asymptotic χ2 distribution under
the null that the moment conditions are valid. Moreover, we report diagnostics for
second-order serial correlation of the error terms (testing the null of no second-order
serial correlation).
Table A3 in the Appendix gives the results of the differenced GMM estimates.14
While Model (1) contains the static specification, Model (2) contains the simplest
dynamic specification adding solely the lagged wage to the explanatory variables.
Model (3) additionally includes lagged rents, while Model (4) contains lags of rents
up to t − 2. Table A3 contains estimates for time-varying regressors only, since
first-differencing eliminates all time-invariant explanatory variables.15
Turning to the main variables of interest, the signs of the rent-coefficients exhibit
the same pattern as the POLS-estimates of Model (6) in Table 2. While the rent-
coefficient is always significantly positive for uncovered establishments, wages appear
to be less sensitive to rents in establishments that are covered by a collective wage
agreement. Including the lagged wage as a further explanatory variable in Model
(2) reduces the rent-coefficients somewhat. As mentioned earlier, using lagged rents
in t−2 as instruments for contemporaneous rents requires that they do not enter eq.
(4) as explanatory variables. To check the robustness of our findings, we therefore
include lagged rents up to t−2 in Model (3) and (4). While lags of rents in t−1 are
14 All estimations have been carried out using the ”XTABOND2”-procedure in STATA
8.0 SE.
15 In our sample, time-invariant variables are the ownership dummy, the east-west
dummy and the industry dummies. The collective bargaining dummies and the works
council dummy are time varying binary regressors.
16
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found to be insignificant in Model (3), lagged rents in t− 2 enter Model (4) signif-
icantly, indicating that wages do not only respond to contemporary establishment
performance, but also to past profitability conditions. In specifications (3) and (4),
the effects of (contemporaneous) rents on wages in uncovered establishments are
reduced, but remain still significant, once lagged rents up to t− 2 are controlled for.
Moreover, from the last rows in the second part of Table A3 it can be seen that all
specifications pass the test of overidentifying restrictions and the AR(2)-test. The
last two rows in the first part of Table A3 report p-values of Wald-statistics testing
the null of β0 = −βpi CENT and β0 = −βpi DECENT for the contemporaneous rent
coefficients. The values indicate that wages appear to be completely insensitive to
profitability conditions in establishments that are covered by a collective agreement,
irrespective of whether the agreement is industry or firm-specific.
With respect to the remaining covariates, the performance of the differenced
GMM estimates turns out to be rather unsatisfactory: although the lagged wage
enters specification (2) and (3) with its expected sign, it is not significant and its
point estimates appear to be implausibly low. In Model (4), the estimate is even
negative. In all specifications, establishment size and the works-council dummy are
always insignificant and for the most part incorrectly signed. The capital-labour
ratio is found to be significant, but with a negative sign. As regards the workforce
composition, the estimates of HIGHSHARE and APPSHARE also seem to be
poorly determined, as they enter almost all regressions with an unexpected sign.
The remaining controls for the workforce composition enter with their expected sign
(except for BLUESHARE in Model (1)), but are not statistically significant.
In light of the poor performance of the differenced GMM-estimates, Table A4
reports results using the System-GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator as proposed by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995). This estimator is motivated by the problem that lagged levels
of a variable are likely to be weak instruments for the equation in first differences
if the individual time series exhibits near unit root properties. Closer inspection of
the time-series properties of the explanatory variables reveals that particularly the
size variable and the capital-labour ratio appear to be close to a random walk.16
The SYS-GMM estimator exploits additional moment conditions for the equation
in levels using lagged differences as instruments in the levels equation. In particu-
16 SYS-GMM estimates of a simple AR(1)-process yield a coefficient of about 0.94 for
establishment size and of 0.91 for the capital-labour ratio.
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lar, predetermined variables are instrumented by contemporaneous first differences
in the levels equation, whereas endogenous and lagged dependent variables are in-
strumented by lagged first differences (Bond 2002). To test the additional moment
conditions implied by the SYS-GMM estimator as compared to the differenced GMM
estimates in Table A3, we present in each column difference tests which refer to the
respective specifications in Table A3. The test statistics are calculated as the dif-
ferences between the Sargan/Hansen statistics of the SYS-GMM and those of the
differenced GMM estimates and have an asymptotic χ2 distribution under the null
that the additional moment restrictions are valid.
Overall, the SYS-GMM estimates appear to be more satisfactory than the dif-
ferenced GMM results. The lagged wage enters all specifications with its expected
sign and its estimates are considerably higher than the differenced GMM estimates,
suggesting that the latter are severely downward biased. In all specifications, es-
tablishment size is found to have a significantly positive impact on average wages
and is estimated much more precisely than in the differenced GMM specification.
This is consistent with the random-walk property of this variable, indicating that
the lagged level of establishment size is a weak instrument for first-differences.
From the human capital covariates, only FEMSHARE and BLUESHARE
enter all regressions with their expected sign. The remaining worker controls are
mostly incorrectly signed and not significant. Turning to the impact of rents on
average wages, the estimates offer a similar picture as the differenced GMM results:
in uncovered establishments, quasi-rents exert a positive impact on wages, while
wages are generally found to be less sensitive to rents in establishments that are
covered by a collective wage agreement. In all specifications, a Wald-Test fails to
reject the null of β0 = −βpi CENT and β0 = −βpi DECENT . Similar to the differenced
GMM estimates, the effects of contemporaneous quasi-rents on wages in uncovered
establishments are further reduced but remain still significant, once lagged wages
and lagged quasi-rents up to t−1 are controlled for. However, controlling for lagged
rents up to t − 2 leads to an insignificant rent-coefficient in uncovered establish-
ments, which is slightly lower than that obtained by the differenced GMM estimates
(Model (4)). All specifications pass the test of overidentifying restrictions and the
AR(2)-test. Moreover, the difference Sargan/Hansen statistic testing the additional
moment restrictions as compared to Table A3 confirms their validity in all specifi-
cations except for Model (3) (with a p−value of 0.056).
18
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Finally, all specifications were re-run assuming that all predetermined explana-
tory variables are uncorrelated with the time-invariant establishment-specific effect.
At least in specification (4), this causes all human capital and establishment covari-
ates to enter with their expected sign. However, the remaining results from these
regressions do only slightly differ from those displayed in Table A4, so that we do
not report them here. Most importantly, the estimates of the rent-coefficients are
very similar to Table A4. In specifications (2) to (4), a Wald-Test again fails to
reject the null of a zero-coefficient on contemporaneous rents under centralised as
well as firm-specific agreements (β0 = −βpi CENT and β0 = −βpi DECENT ). Only in
Model (1), the null of a zero-coefficient can be rejected under centralised agreements
at the 10 per cent level (with a p−value of 0.068). In uncovered establishments, the
coefficients on contemporaneous rents are slightly larger than those in Table A4,
ranging between 0.095 in Model (1) and 0.056 in Model (4).
Comparing the GMM-estimates of the rent-sharing coefficients to the POLS-
estimates reveals that the POLS-estimates still yield positive estimates of the rent-
sharing coefficient in covered establishments, whereas the SYS-GMM-results ac-
counting for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of rents point to a rent-
sharing coefficient of zero. This finding is indicative of the presence of unobserved
factors in covered establishments which are positively correlated with profits and
impact positively upon wages. One such factor may be that a compressed wage
structure under centralised wage contracts causes firms to upgrade the quality of
their workforce. This might lead to higher unobserved worker quality in such firms
and therefore to upward-biased estimates in the simple POLS-specification. Com-
paring the GMM-estimates of the rent-sharing coefficients to the POLS estimates
in uncovered establishments points to similar figures. While the POLS-coefficient
in uncovered establishments amounts to 0.061, the SYS-GMM-estimates range be-
tween 0.044 and 0.095. Given these coefficients and mean wages and quasi-rents
per employee of 38.78 and 37.15 in uncovered establishments, the elasticity of the
average wage with respect to contemporaneous quasi-rents is of the magnitude 0.042
to 0.091. How do these results compare to other estimates for Germany? Hu¨bler
and Ko¨nig (1998) use data from the Hannover establishment panel and report an
elasticity of about 0.12, while Klodt (2000: pp.172-182) finds an elasticity of 0.14
using the same data set. However, those studies do not allow the rent-coefficient to
vary with collective bargaining coverage. Compared to these figures, our estimate of
19
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the contemporaneous rent-coefficient in uncovered establishments therefore appears
to be rather low. However, given the variability of rents, our results suggest that the
quantitative role of rent-sharing in wage determination is nevertheless substantial:
calculating the share of variance in the distribution of wages due to the variability
in rents, it can be shown that the variability in per-capita rents explains about 15.7
to 33.9 per cent of the variability in (average) establishment wages.17
For centralised wage-agreements, the invariance of wages against establishment-
specific profitability indicates that the fraction of establishments making use of flex-
ibility provisions seems to be rather negligible. Even though firms may pay wages
above the going rate and may adopt opt-out clauses, this potential for adjustments
to local profitability conditions appears to be largely unused.18 Even more striking
is the invariance of wages against local profits in establishments that are subject to
a firm-specific wage contract. Although this result is to be interpreted with caution
as the number of observations with a firm-specific wage contract is rather small, it
does not seem to confirm our first hypothesis which led us to expect the sensitiv-
ity of wages to profits under firm-specific contracts to be larger than in uncovered
establishments. In sum, these findings lend support to our second hypothesis that
unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and suppress inter-firm
wage differentials.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Sample Selection
The use of dynamic panel data methods imposes strong restrictions on the size of
our final sample, since we have to exclude all establishments featuring less than 4
consecutive time series observations. Tables A1a and A1b in the Appendix compare
sample statistics for the original sample and the final sample used in the preceding
17 This calculation is performed under the assumption that 95 per cent of the mass of
a symmetric distribution is within plus or minus 2 standard deviations of the mean. The
contribution of the variability of rents to the variability of wages can then be calculated
as:
βpi(pi+2σpi)−βpi(pi−2σpi)
(w+2σw)−(w−2σw) =
βpi ·σpi
σw
(see e.g. Margolis and Salvanes 2001).
18 This finding corroborates the results of Franz and Pfeiffer (2003), which are based on
an employer survey of about 800 German firms. Their results indicate that only 18 per
cent of those employers that covered by a collective contract allowing for hardship clauses
make use of such provisions.
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analysis. The figures show that establishments subject to a collective contract are
on average considerably larger and more capital-intensive in the final sample than
in the original sample. The differences for uncovered establishments mainly concern
the qualification structure, with a larger fraction of qualified blue-collar employees
in the final sample as compared to the original statistics. It is clear that this sample
selection might bias our estimates, although the direction of bias is not clear a-priori.
For example, unions might want to suppress rent-sharing in large establishments
due to high transaction costs. Efficiency wage considerations, which might also
play a role in explaining a positive profit effect, lead us to expect the wage-profit
correlation to increase with establishment size and capital-intensity. To assess the
importance and direction of bias involved with our sample selection, we re-ran the
POLS regressions using the original sample of 3,515 establishments.
Re-running the POLS regressions separately by bargaining coverage on the orig-
inal sample gives point estimates of the rent-coefficients of 0.045, 0.020 and 0.024
(for no-coverage, centralised contracts and firm-specific contracts, respectively) as
compared to 0.071, 0.013 and 0.032 for the final sample. However, the differences
in the rent-coefficient are statistically significant only for uncovered establishments.
This leads us to conclude that for covered establishments our results are fairly ro-
bust to sample selection, whereas the selection appears to involve an upward bias
of the rent-coefficient for uncovered establishments. Note that this might be caused
by the differences in qualification structures. If rent-sharing is more relevant for
blue-collar workers, then the overrepresentation of establishments employing large
fractions of such employees in the final sample will bias the extent of rent-sharing
upwards. However, it should be noted that this does not affect the robustness of
our results concerning the overall pattern of wage responses, since for uncovered
establishments the rent-coefficient is estimated to be significantly positive, whereas
wages in covered establishments are still found to be completely invariant against
establishment-specific profitability conditions.
5.2 Alternative Interpretations of the Correlation between
Wages and Rents
Several authors have emphasised that a positive correlation between quasi-rents and
wages need not necessarily imply rent-sharing, but may simply reflect movements
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of labour demand along an upward sloping labour supply curve (see e.g. Blanch-
flower et al. 1996, van Reenen 1996, Hildreth and Oswald 1997). If this were the
case, the inclusion of the employment level should render the coefficient on quasi-
rents insignificant. For uncovered establishments we are able to rule out such an
alternative interpretation, since the positive coefficient on quasi-rents is robust to
the inclusion of establishment size as an explanatory variable in all regressions. As
a further robustness check we have also included employment growth a proxy for
demand shocks in the differenced GMM regressions, which left the coefficients on
quasi-rents also largely unchanged.19
5.3 Endogeneity of the Bargaining Regime
Thus far, we have considered the collective bargaining regime as exogenous. How-
ever, in Germany firms may leave their employers’ associations and may, thus, to
some extent influence the choice of the bargaining regime. This shows up in our
data, where the share of establishments subject to a centralised contract declined
from 82 per cent in 1995 to 75 per cent in 2001, and the fraction of establish-
ments with a firm-specific agre ment decreased from 8.5 to 6 per cent. What is
relevant for our estimates is that a non-random selection into the regimes might
bias our rent-sharing coefficients, particularly if a firm’s choice is correlated with its
profitability conditions. If, for example, centralised contracts shelter firms against
excessive rent-sharing at the firm-level, highly profitable firms might systematically
select themselves into the centralised regime. To check the robustness of our find-
ings to the endogeneity of the collective bargaining regime, we first estimate eq. (1)
separately by bargaining coverage using a selection model which accounts for a po-
tential non-random selection into the three wage determination regimes. To assess
the importance of a potential endogeneity bias, we subsequently compare the esti-
mates with the corresponding POLS regression results. Defining regimes R1, R2 and
R3 as wage determination under no-coverage, centralised contracts and firm-specific
contracts, respectively, the wage equations for each regime Rj, j = 1, 2, 3, become
wj = αj + βjpi · pij + γj · x′j + δj · s′j + uj if Rj = 1, (5)
where the variance of uj is given by σ
2 and the indices i, t are suppressed for
expositional convenience. To account for E(uj|Rj = 1), we adopt an extension of
19 The results are not reported here, but are available on request.
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the two-step selection-bias correction method developed by Heckman (1979), which
has been proposed by Lee (1983). Assuming that selectivity into the regimes can
be modelled as a multinomial logit with a vector of explanatory variables z′ and a
parameter vector θj, Lee (1983) shows that
E(w|Rj = 1) = αj + βjpi · pij + γj · x′j + δj · s′j − σρjλj(θj · z′). (6)
where
λj( θj · z′) = φ(Φ
−1(Pj))
Pj
, j = 1, 2, 3 and Pj =
exp(θj · z′)∑
k
exp(θk · z′) , j, k = 1, 2, 3, (7)
and with ρj denoting the correlation-coefficient between uj and the unobservables
in the selection equation (eq. (8) in the Appendix). A more detailed exposition of
this selectivity correction can be found in Appendix A1. From eq. (6) it can be
seen that OLS estimates of eq. (5) are biased if λj(θj · z′) is correlated with
the observables in eq. (5) and uj and the error term in the selection equation
are correlated. Consistent estimates of all parameters of interest in eq. (6) may
be obtained by a two-step procedure, where the first step involves the generation of
predicted values of λj(θj·z′) by estimating the selection equation using a multinomial
logit approach. In the second step, the predicted values are added to eq. (5), which
is estimated by OLS. In the selection equation, the vector of observables z′ includes
the observables in eq. (5) and further identifying covariates which are excluded
from eq. (5). For the excluded observables, we choose (1) a dummy taking on
the value of unity if an establishment belongs to a publicly listed company and (2)
an establishment-age dummy indicating whether an establishment has been founded
after 1990 or earlier. We believe that those variables provide appropriate identifying
exclusion restrictions for several reasons. First, when testing the significance of those
variables in eq. (5) estimated separately by bargaining coverage, the corresponding
F -tests indicate that both variables have no direct significant impact on wages (with
p-values of 0.18, 0.24 and 0.44). Second, the identifying variables all appear to be
significant predictors of the bargaining regime, since the corresponding F -statistic
is highly significant in the selection equation (with a p-value close to zero). Third,
we argue that is reasonable to assume that the identifying variables are exogenous
in the selection equation, since they are unlikely to be influenced by unobservables
affecting the bargaining regime.
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Table A5 in the Appendix shows the POLS estimates and the selectivity-corrected
estimates using the original sample of 3,515 establishments. The negative coefficients
on λj(θj · z′), which are estimates of −σρj, indicate that the choice of collective
contracts is endogenous, with the error term in the selection equation and uj being
positively correlated. In the uncovered regime, the coefficient on λj(θj · z′) is posi-
tive, but not significantly different from zero. The direction of bias under collective
contracts depends on the correlation between λj(θj · z′) and the covariates in eq.
(5). Given that λj(θj · z′) is decreasing in Pj and in all covariates that have a posi-
tive impact on Pj, the negative estimates of −σρj suggest that the OLS-coefficients
on covariates that are positively correlated with the choice of either centralised or
firm-specific contracts should be upward biased. The multinomial logit estimates
in Table A6 show that the log-odds ratio of choosing centralised contracts as com-
pared to no-coverage increases significantly with quasi-rents. By contrast, the effect
of quasi-rents on the log-odds ratio of choosing firm-specific contracts as compared to
no-coverage is found to be insignificant. The resulting marginal effects of quasi-rents
on centralised contracts, firm-specific contracts and no-coverage are 0.0002, -0.00003
and -0.0002. Given the estimated coefficients on λj(θj · z′), we expect that correct-
ing for selectivity should make little difference under no-coverage and firm-specific
contracts, and should lead to a decline in the coefficient under centralised contracts.
Indeed, the selectivity-corrected rent-sharing coefficient is found to be slightly lower
for centralised contracts than the corresponding OLS coefficient. As selectivity plays
no major role for the uncovered regime, most of the selectivity-corrected estimates do
not substantially differ from the OLS-estimates. If a selectivity-correction changes
anything at all, it results in even smaller rent-coeffcients under centralised contracts.
In sum, this leads us to conclude that the overall pattern of rent-sharing across the
three wage determination regimes appears to be quite robust to the endogeneity of
the bargaining regime.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper was twofold: first, we have addressed the question of whether
German wages respond to firm-specific profitability conditions and second, we have
been interested in whether the sensitivity of wages to firm profits depends on collec-
tive bargaining coverage. The institutional discussion has shown that firm-specific
contracts and flexibility provisions under centralised contracts provide a means to
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adjust wages to local conditions at the firm-level and that such adjustments are gen-
erally influenced by industry-wide unions which may retain control over centralised
union objectives. Provided those flexibility provisions are used, bargaining power
considerations lead us to expect wages to react stronger to local conditions in firms
that are covered by a collective contract than in uncovered firms. However, there
are various reasons for why unions might not want to adjust wages to local firm per-
formance, such as high transaction costs or workers’ demand for income insurance.
We therefore take our empirical findings as a test of whether flexibility provisions
are really exploited or whether unions suppress inter-firm wage dispersion due to
heterogeneous firm performance.
Using data from the IAB Establishment-Panel, the results of our empirical anal-
ysis offer a remarkably consistent picture: in general, rent-sharing is found to be an
empirically relevant phenomenon in Germany. However, the extent of rent-sharing
seems to be significantly lower in establishments that are subject to a collective
wage agreement - irrespective of whether the agreement is industry- or firm-specific.
While POLS-estimates still yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in
covered establishments, GMM-r sults accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and
the endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero. This finding is
indicative of the presence of unobserved factors in covered establishments which are
positively correlated with profits and impact positively upon wages. One such factor
may be that a compressed intra-firm wage structure under collective wage contracts
causes establishments to upgrade the quality of their workforce. This might lead
to higher unobserved worker productivity in such establishments and therefore to
upward-biased estimates in the simple POLS-specification. Finally, we find the pat-
tern of rent-sharing to be robust to sample selection and the endogeneity of the
bargaining regime.
For centralised wage-agreements, the invariance of wages against local profits
suggests that the use of flexibility provisions in central wage agreements appears to
be empirically negligible. Even though firms may pay wages above the going rate
and may make use of opt-out clauses, the potential for adjustments to local prof-
itability conditions appears to be largely unused. A similar result holds for wage
determination under firm-specific wage contracts. As such contracts are generally
concluded by industry-specific unions, one possible explanation might be that a con-
siderable fraction of firm-specific contracts simply adopts wage bargains negotiated
25
Page 26 of 74
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
in the corresponding industry agreement. Taken together, our results seem to sup-
port the notion that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and
suppress firm-level rent-sharing, either due to workers’ demand for income insurance
or due to high transaction costs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Selectivity correction
Defining regimes R1, R2 and R3 as wage determination under no-coverage, cen-
tralised contracts and firm-specific contracts, respectively, the wage equations for
each regime Rj, j = 1, 2, 3, become
wj = αj + βjpi · pij + γj · x′j + δj · s′j + uj if Rj = 1, (8)
where the variance of uj is given by σ
2 and the indices i, t are suppressed for ex-
positional convenience. Selection into the three regimes is modelled by the following
equation
R∗j = θj · z′ + ηj , j = 1, 2, 3, (9)
where R∗j denotes the unobserved utility from choosing bargaining regime Rj,
which is determined by a vector of observable covariates z′ with a parameter vector
θj. ηj denotes an error term which is possibly correlated with uj. Regime Rj is being
chosen when its utility R∗j exceeds the utility levels of the other regimes, i.e. if R
∗
j >
max
k 6=j
{R∗k} , j = 1, 2, 3, which is equivalent to
θj · z′ > εj with εj = max
k 6=j
{θk · z′ + ηk − ηj} , j = 1, 2, 3. (10)
It is clear from eqs. (8) and (10) that unbiased estimates of all parameters of
interest will be obtained only if E(uj|θj · z′ > εj) = 0. To account for E(uj|θj ·
z′ > εj), Lee (1983) proposes an extension of the two-step selection-bias correction
method developed by Heckman (1979). Assuming that the error term u is normally
distributed and selectivity into the regimes can be modelled as a multinomial logit,
Lee (1983) shows that
E(uj|θj · z′ > εj ) = −σρjλj( θj · z′) (11)
where
λj( θj · z′) = φ(Φ
−1(Pj))
Pj
, j = 1, 2, 3 and Pj =
exp(θj · z′)∑
k
exp(θk · z′) , j, k = 1, 2, 3, (12)
and ρj is the correlation-coefficient between uj and (a transformation of) εj. The
conditional expectation of wages, given that bargaining regime Rj is being chosen,
then becomes eq. (6) in the main text.
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A.2 Descriptive Statistics by Bargaining Coverage
CENT DECENT NO-COVERAGE
Variables Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
w 54.64 17.66 48.37 16.04 38.78 17.95
pi 85.14 102.28 68.40 90.40 37.15 64.13
w 53.42 10.87 49.63 10.93 46.61 11.97
HIGHSHARE 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.19
BLUESHARE 0.39 0.22 0.47 0.23 0.48 0.25
APPSHARE 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07
FEMSHARE 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.29 0.24
SIZE 865.33 3,123.63 417.65 870.11 75.81 161.27
WCOUNCIL 0.80 0.40 0.75 0.44 0.24 0.43
K/L 204.85 400.02 721.65 3,780.18 150.59 385.72
EAST 0.29 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.68 0.47
OWN 0.20 0.40 0.12 0.32 0.28 0.45
Obs. 2,120 392 899
Table A2a: Final sample
CENT DECENT NO-COVERAGE
Variables Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
w 53.80 19.02 47.65 18.53 38.68 18.24
pi 81.95 103.10 71.42 106.92 40.26 74.40
w 53.74 10.95 50.06 11.29 48.46 12.15
HIGHSHARE 0.26 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.21
BLUESHARE 0.39 0.22 0.46 0.24 0.45 0.26
APPSHARE 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08
FEMSHARE 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.21 0.31 0.25
SIZE 650.80 2,214.64 366.84 1,019.92 72.09 161.91
WCOUNCIL 0.75 0.43 0.69 0.46 0.21 0.41
K/L 177.55 381.70 405.84 2,537.03 140.07 362.74
EAST 0.27 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.66 0.47
OWN 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.33 0.47
Obs. 4,751 892 2,974
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1995-2002.
Note: All monetary values are measured in 1,000 DM. 1 e corresponds to 1.95583 DM.
Table A2b: Original sample
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A.3 Regression Results
Model 1 2 3 4
w 0.403∗∗ 0.360∗ 0.322 0.330
(0.175) (0.190) (0.198) (0.211)
w(t-1) 0.064 0.066 -0.002
(0.042) (0.043) (0.056)
pi 0.077∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.047∗
(0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
pi∗CENT -0.079∗∗ -0.073∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
pi∗DECENT -0.092∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.065∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038)
pi(t-1) 0.023 0.034
(0.025) (0.035)
pi∗CENT(t-1) -0.011 -0.028
(0.021) (0.028)
pi∗DECENT(t-1) -0.016 -0.018
(0.022) (0.035)
pi(t-2) 0.043∗
(0.024)
pi∗CENT(t-2) -0.047∗
(0.024)
pi∗DECENT(t-2) -0.036
(0.028)
pi = −pi∗CENT 0.908 0.586 0.321 0.429
(p−value)
pi = −pi∗DECENT 0.586 0.504 0.415 0.481
(p−value)
∗Significant at 10%-level.
∗∗Significant at 5%-level.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level.
Table A3: Differenced GMM regression results
... to be continued on next page
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... continue Table A3
Model 1 2 3 4
HIGHSHARE -12.835∗∗ -9.038∗ -8.310 -11.834
(5.133) (5.346) (5.140) (6.927)
BLUESHARE -1.280 2.578 2.379 5.706
(2.568) (3.098) (3.003) (3.549)
APPSHARE -1.818 8.088 6.258 11.176
(11.414) (13.274) (13.294) (16.319)
FEMSHARE -1.834 -5.925 -5.832 -6.503
(8.722) (9.083) (8.933) (10.561)
SIZE -0.001 -3.0e−04 -7.0e−04 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
SIZE2 -1.92e−08 -1.61e−08 -6.34e−09 -1.30e−08
(2.98e−08) (2.96e−08) (3.20e−08) (4.55e−08)
CENT 3.652∗∗ 3.694∗∗ 3.863∗∗ 3.252∗
(1.809) (1.723) (1.672) (1.665)
DECENT 4.179∗∗ 3.981∗ 3.783∗ 2.794
(2.020) (2.074) (2.041) (1.994)
WCOUNCIL -1.702 -2.243 -2.490 -1.043
(2.080) (2.125) (2.108) (2.618)
K/L -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(4.0e−04) (3.0e−04) (3.0e−04) (3.0e−04)
Sargan/Hansen 0.288 0.463 0.604 0.443
(p−value)
AR(2) (p−value) 0.932 0.460 0.688 0.401
Establishments 661 661 661 661
Observations 2,750 2,089 2,089 1,428
Note: The dependent variable is the aggregate per-capita wagebill. All
variables are first-differenced. Results are reported for one-step differenced
GMM-estimators. All specifications include time dummies.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗Significant at 10%-level.
∗∗ Significant at 5%-level.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level.
Table A3: Differenced GMM regression results
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Model 1 2 3 4
w 0.386∗∗ 0.374∗∗ 0.323∗∗ 0.367∗
(0.156) (0.149) (0.161) (0.197)
w(t-1) 0.221∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.051)
pi 0.084∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.044
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
pi∗CENT -0.070∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.053∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
pi∗DECENT -0.062∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.053
(0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.035)
pi(t-1) 0.007 0.006
(0.016) (0.019)
pi∗CENT(t-1) 0.014 0.011
(0.013) (0.016)
pi∗DECENT(t-1) 0.006 0.024
(0.015) (0.020)
pi(t-2) 0.019
(0.014)
pi∗CENT(t-2) -0.023
(0.016)
pi∗DECENT(t-2) -0.004
(0.019)
pi = -pi∗CENT 0.267 0.739 0.389 0.535
(p−value)
pi = -pi∗DECENT 0.204 0.483 0.906 0.689
(p−value)
∗ Significant at 10%-level.
∗∗ Significant at 5%-level.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level.
Table A4: SYS-GMM regression results
... to be continued on next page
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... continue Table A4
Model 1 2 3 4
HIGHSHARE -7.306 -5.846 -4.884 -3.073
(4.756) (4.976) (4.867) (5.935)
BLUESHARE 3.618 6.267∗ 6.140∗ 11.751∗∗
(2.990) (3.606) (3.537) (4.647)
APPSHARE -10.914 -7.663 -8.394 3.351
(11.145) (11.573) (11.883) (19.267)
FEMSHARE -4.603 -5.326 -4.706 -4.775
(4.929) (4.720) (4.688) (5.291)
SIZE 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(7.0e−04) (7.0e−04) (7.0e−04) (8.0e−04)
SIZE2 -2.69e−08∗ -2.22e−08 -2.28e−08 -2.80e−08
(1.46e−08) 1.44e−08 (1.49e−08) (1.76e−08)
CENT 4.850∗∗∗ 4.809∗∗∗ 5.279∗∗∗ 3.710∗
(1.861) (1.856) (1.818) (2.066)
DECENT 3.258∗∗ 3.613∗∗ 3.498∗∗ 4.276∗
(1.636) (1.627) (1.690) (2.479)
WCOUNCIL 6.210∗∗ 3.882 3.841 4.250
(2.633) (2.392) (2.395) (2.796)
K/L 3.67e−06 -2.0e−04 -1.0e−04 -3.0e−04
(1.0e−04) (2.0e−04) (2.0e−04) (2.0e−04)
Sargan/Hansen 0.312 0.346 0.312 0.318
(p−value)
Diff. Test comp. to 0.484 0.220 0.056 0.184
Table A2 (p−value)
AR(2) (p−value) 0.713 0.128 0.204 0.118
Establishments 661 661 661 661
Observations 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,089
Note: The dependent variable is the aggregate per-capita wagebill. Results
are reported for one-step SYS-GMM-estimators. All specifications include
time dummies, 15 industry dummies as well as an east-west and an ownership
dummy. All endogenous and predetermined variables are assumed to be
correlated with the establishment-specific effect.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗Significant at 10%-level.
∗∗ Significant at 5%-level.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level.
Table A4: SYS-GMM regression results
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CENT DECENT NO-COVERAGE
OLS Selectivity OLS Selectivity OLS Selectivity
corrected corrected corrected
pi 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
w 0.547∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.072) (0.157) (0.157) (0.066) (0.083)
HIGHSHARE 17.996∗∗∗ 15.715∗∗∗ 14.622∗∗∗ 16.117∗∗∗ 14.544∗∗∗ 14.284∗∗∗
(1.923) (1.953) (4.487) (4.442) (2.064) (2.482)
BLUESHARE 4.944∗∗∗ 4.485∗∗∗ 5.259∗∗ 3.696 6.433∗∗∗ 6.306∗∗∗
(1.174) (1.247) (2.183) (2.524) (1.076) (1.261)
APPSHARE 1.562 -1.451 8.141 11.216 -6.885∗ -7.050∗∗
(4.007) (4.541) (9.067) (11.931) (3.638) (3.447)
FEMSHARE -19.017∗∗∗ -17.510∗∗∗ -14.397∗∗∗ -15.159∗∗∗ -12.565∗∗∗ -12.291∗∗∗
(1.327) (1.447) (2.924) (2.995) (1.184) (1.670)
SIZE 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(3.00e−04) (3.00e−04) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
SIZE2 -2.60e−08∗∗ -1.92e−08 -4.10e−08 -6.90e−08 -8.81e−06∗∗∗ -8.79e−06∗∗∗
(1.07e−08) (1.29e−08) (8.74e−08) (2.24e−07) (2.06e−06) (2.38e−06)
WCOUNCIL 8.491∗∗∗ 5.455∗∗∗ 7.470∗∗∗ 4.141∗∗ 3.256∗∗∗ 2.763
(0.595) (1.075) (1.092) (2.017) (0.672) (2.344)
K/L 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 6.28e−05 -0.0004∗∗ 2.00e−04 2.00e−04
(7.00e−04) (7.00e−04) (1.10e−04) (3.00e−04) (8.00e−04) (8.00e−04)
OWN -4.442∗∗∗ -4.825∗∗∗ -4.720∗∗∗ -4.064∗∗ -6.524∗∗∗ -6.598∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.622) (1.334) (1.345) (0.511) (0.698)
EAST -3.194∗∗∗ 0.206 -3.588 -5.487∗∗ -8.713∗∗∗ -8.308∗∗∗
(1.009) (1.431) (2.240) (2.253) (1.020) (2.165)
Intercept 8.036∗∗∗ 8.752∗ 5.050 21.610∗ 24.197∗∗∗ 22.453∗∗
(3.746) (4.784) (9.511) (11.367) (4.844) (10.394)
λj(θj·z′) -6.124∗∗∗ -9.569∗∗∗ 0.781
(1.814) (3.388) (3.531)
Ind.-/Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,725 4,725 892 892 2,970 2,970
Note: The dependent variable is the aggregate per-capita wagebill. Heteroscedasticity-robust
(POLS) and bootstrapped standard errors (selectivity corrected results - 100 repetitions)
are in parentheses. All models include time dummies and 15 industry dummies.
∗Significant at 10%-level ∗∗ Significant at 5%-level ∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level
Table A5: Selectivity corrected regression results
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log P (DECENT)
P (NO COVERAGE)
log P (CENT)
P (NO COVERAGE)
pi 5.82e−04 0.001∗∗∗
(5.06e−04) (3.79e−04)
w -0.033∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007)
HIGHSHARE 0.438 1.189∗∗∗
(0.345) (0.240)
BLUESHARE 0.594∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.155)
APPSHARE -0.608 0.910∗
(0.845) (0.534)
FEMSHARE -0.696∗∗∗ -1.424∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.179)
SIZE 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(1.80e−04) (2.00e−04)
WCOUNCIL 1.621∗∗∗ 1.587∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.759)
K/L 1.12e−04 -8.92e−06
(7.18e−05) (7.10e−05)
OWN 0.009 0.266∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.073)
EAST -0.719∗∗∗ -1.714∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.122)
Publicly listed company 0.529∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.211)
Founded in 1990 or later 0.076 -0.531∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.071)
Observations 8,587
Pseudo R2 0.254
Note: The dependent variable is the bargaining regime.
The specification includes time dummies and 15 industry dummies.
∗Significant at 10%-level
∗∗ Significant at 5%-level
∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level
Table A6: Multinomial logit estimates
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Rent-Sharing and Collective Wage Contracts -
Evidence from German Establishment-Level Data
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Abstract
Using German establishment-level data, this paper analyses whether wages re-
spond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the
question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies with collective bargaining cov-
erage. In this context, two conflicting hypotheses are tested. The first one asserts
that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm-level and appropriate a larger
share of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The second one states
that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and suppress the re-
sponsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability conditions. The empirical analy-
sis provides strong support for the second hypothesis. While pooled OLS estimates
yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments,
dynamic panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the en-
dogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.
Keywords: Rent-Sharing, Wage-Setting Structure, Unions, Panel Data
JEL Code: C23, J31, J51
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1 Introduction
The question of whether wages vary systematically with firms’ ability-to-pay has long
been of considerable interest to labour economists. In the literature, various theoretical
explanations have been advanced for a positive relationship between wages and profits (see
e.g. Blanchflower et al. 1996, Hildreth and Oswald 1997). Apart from temporary frictions
and efficiency wages, a frequently invoked explanation refers to union power. Under
collective bargaining, workers’ remuneration may be expected to increase with profits, as
unions will be able to appropriate part of the industry or firm-specific rents. Whether
wages react to industry or firm-specific conditions should naturally depend on the level
of bargaining. Intuitively, wages ought to be most responsive to firm-specific profitability
conditions if wage determination allows for some adjustment to local conditions at the
firm level.
Although the bargaining structure appears to be an important determinant for the
degree of rent-sharing at the firm or industry level, there is surprisingly little empirical
evidence on this topic. While the question of whether wages vary systematically with prof-
its has spawned a vast empirical literature (see e.g. Abowd and Lemieux 1993, van Reenen
1996, Arai 2003, Budd et al. 2005)1, few studies explicitly address the role of the bargain-
ing structure for rent-sharing. One exception is the study by Holmlund and Zetterberg
(1991), which draws on a cross-country comparison to analyse this question. The authors
find that countries with highly centralised and coordinated bargaining institutions exhibit
less industry level rent-sharing than countries with relatively decentralised bargaining sys-
tems. In this paper, we draw on establishment-level data from Germany and present new
evidence on rent-sharing and collective bargaining by exploiting intra-national variations
in the bargaining structure. Clearly, such variations offer the advantage of controlling
for a large part of the unobserved heterogeneity in institutional conditions characterising
cross-country comparisons.
The German institutional environment provides a useful example for the coexistence of
different bargaining structures. Until the early 1990s, wage determination was dominated
by centralised wage bargaining between industry-specific unions and employers’ associ-
1Further studies include Christofides and Oswald (1992), Blanchflower et al. (1996), Hildreth and
Oswald (1997), Abowd et al. (1999), Margolis and Salvanes (2001), Kramarz (2003), Dobbelaere (2004)
and Martins (2006) amongst others. There are only few previous studies on the relationship between
wages and profits in Germany: Hu¨bler and Ko¨nig (1998) and Klodt (2000) use data from the ’Hanover
establishment panel’ and report a significant positive impact of profits on average firm wages.
1
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ations. Industry agreements were embedded in a corporatist environment characterised
by a high degree of coordination (Soskice 1990). However, in the last decade, there has
been a strong tendency towards decentralisation of wage determination, as wage deter-
mination without any bargaining coverage has increasingly grown in importance (Hassel
1999, Ochel 2005). Even within centralised industry agreements, there have been numer-
ous attempts to allow for more (downward) flexibility of wages by introducing opt-out
and hardship clauses. Moreover, since bargained wages in centralised agreements merely
represent a lower bound for wages, there is also sufficient room for upward flexibility.
Given this intra-national variation in German wage determination regimes, the princi-
pal aim of this paper is to shed light on the following questions: Do firm-specific contracts
and flexibility provisions in centralised industry agreements allow for rent-sharing at the
firm level? If so, does the extent of rent-sharing differ from that in firms without any bar-
gaining coverage? A striking feature of the German wage determination process is that
decentralisation in collective wage determination merely refers to the level of bargaining
and not to the degree of coordination. The reason is that - as will be discussed below -
collective wage determination at the firm level is generally influenced by industry-wide
unions which may retain control over centralised union objectives. Bargaining power con-
siderations lead us to expect the extent of rent-sharing to be larger the more coordinated
the wage-setting process and the more decentralised the level of wage determination. The
first hypothesis to be tested, therefore, is that unions are able to skim off an even larger
part of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The question of whether
this notion may be confirmed empirically is of considerable interest in an institutional
environment such as the German one, which has long been regarded as corporatist and
has been thought of to offer little scope for excessive rent-sharing at the firm level. On
the other hand, there are various reasons why unions might favour a compressed intra-
industry wage structure, such as high transaction costs or workers’ demand for income
insurance (see Agell and Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995, Agell 2002). A countervailing
hypothesis to be tested, therefore, is that unions suppress any inter-firm wage dispersion
due to heterogeneous firm performance.
We investigate the relationship between wages and profitability using the IAB Estab-
lishment Panel. This data set is particularly useful for our purposes as it provides detailed
information on whether an establishment is subject to an industry-wide wage agreement,
a firm-specific wage agreement or to no wage agreement at all. In our estimation strategy,
we first focus on simple static pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) estimates. The OLS
2
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estimations serve as a benchmark case and will be modified by using dynamic panel data
methods. First, we address the possibility of unobserved firm-specific time invariant fac-
tors. A second problem concerns the endogeneity of our profitability measure, since wages
and profits are simultaneously determined. Third, we consider dynamic specifications to
allow for possible dynamics in the response of wages to profitability conditions. Finally,
we investigate whether our results are robust to sample selection and the endogeneity of
the bargaining structure.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the institutional background of
German wage determination is presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides a theoretical
discussion to derive testable hypotheses about the extent of rent-sharing under the dif-
ferent wage-setting regimes. These hypotheses are tested in Section 4. While Section
4.1. presents the general empirical model, Section 4.2. describes the data set and the
main variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.3. reports the estimation results.
Section 5 discusses the robustness of the results. Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion
and some conclusions.
2 Institutional Background
In Germany, basically three forms of wage determination may be distinguished: cen-
tral collective wage agreements, firm-specific collective wage agreements as well as wage
determination without any collective bargaining coverage. Until the early 1990s, wages
determination was dominated by central regional and industry-wide collective wage agree-
ments (Fla¨chentarifvertra¨ge). Such central wage agreements are negotiated between an
industry-specific trade union and an employers’ association. They are legally binding on
all member firms of the respective employers’ association and on all employees who are
members of the trade union. Although, strictly speaking, the negotiated wage only applies
to union members, member firms generally extend the wage settlement to non-member
employees as well.2
Since the early 1990s, centralised collective wage agreements have substantially de-
clined in importance in the German system of wage determination (see e.g. Hassel 1999,
2The reason is that non-unionised employees who would receive a lower wage may be expected to join
the union anyway in order to benefit from the higher union wage. In addition, central wage agreements
may also apply to non-member firms and their employees if the agreement is declared to be generally
binding by the Federal Ministry of Labour.
3
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Kohaut and Schnabel 2003). The tendency towards more decentralisation is the result of
three major developments. First, the number of firm-specific collective wage agreements
has grown in absolute terms.3 These agreements are negotiated between an individual
firm and a union. A noteworthy feature of these agreements is that they are concluded by
industry-specific unions and do not involve uncoordinated wage bargaining of independent
firm-specific unions. That is, decentralisation here merely refers to the level of bargaining
and not to the degree of coordination. Second, wages are now more often determined
without any bargaining coverage at all. In firms that are not covered by a collective
agreement wages are either determined in individual wage contracts or in plant-specific
agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) between works councils and the management.4 In
contrast to firm-specific collective wage agreements, this kind of wage determination can
be characterised as decentralised and uncoordinated. Third, there is a tendency even
within centralised wage agreements to allow for more flexibility at the firm level. In
recent years, contractual opt-out clauses or hardship clauses have become a widespread
element of central agreements. While opt-out clauses delegate issues that are usually
specified in the central agreement, such as working-time and pay-conditions, to the plant
level, hardship clauses enable firms to be exempted from the centralised agreement if they
are close to bankruptcy. In general, the adoption of such clauses requires the approval of
the collective bargaining parties (Hassel 1999, Ochel 2005). Moreover, bargained wages in
centralised agreements merely represent a lower bound for wages, so that there is always
sufficient room for upward flexibility. Even though the wage drift is part of the local
negotiations between works councils and the firm, it is also likely to be coordinated by
the centralised bargaining parties. The reason is that union density among works councils
members is very high (Hassel 1999), and this is particularly relevant for covered firms.
Thus, similar to firm-specific collective contracts, the adoption of flexibility provisions in
centralised wage agreements is still coordinated by the centralised bargaining parties and
involves merely a decentralisation of the level of bargaining.
3According to the German Federal Ministry of Labour the number of firms with a firm-specific wage
agreement increased economy-wide from about 2,500 in 1990 to 8,000 in 2004. However, evidence from
the IAB Establishment Panel indicates that, in relative terms, firm-specific contracts have again declined
in importance since the mid 1990s: Between 1996 and 2004 the fraction of establishments with a firm-
specific contract decreased from 10 to 2 per cent in western Germany, while the decline was from 15 to
4 per cent in eastern Germany.
4According to the German Works Constitution Act, works councils are not allowed to negotiate
about issues that are normally dealt with in collective agreements, even in firms that are not party
to collective agreements. In practice, however, works councils may be expected to play a crucial role in
wage determination (see e.g. Hassel 1999, Hu¨bler and Jirjahn 2003).
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3 Theoretical Considerations
The purpose of the present section is to derive testable hypotheses about the degree of
rent-sharing under the different wage determination regimes. The institutional discussion
in Section 2 has yielded two important insights. First, collective contracts are by no
means an obstacle to the adjustment of wages to local conditions at the firm level, since
recent decentralisation tendencies in Germany have introduced - at least formally - the
option of making such adjustments. Second, even if wages are collectively determined at
the firm level, they are still influenced by industry-wide unions which may retain control
over centralised union objectives.
Thus far, the theoretical literature has mainly focused on the effects of different bar-
gaining regimes on overall wage levels (see e.g. Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Soskice 1990,
Dowrick 1993). There is little theory to guide us on the expected effects on the returns
to firm-specific attributes such as profits. The rent-sharing literature generally predicts a
pay-performance link that depends on the relative bargaining strength of the bargaining
parties (e.g. Abowd and Lemieux 1993, Blanchflower et al. 1996, van Reenen 1996).
Such considerations lead us to expect the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific profits to be
larger under firm-specific contracts than in uncovered firms. An important argument is
that firm-specific contracts in Germany are concluded by industry-specific unions, whose
bargaining power is likely to be considerably greater than that of works councils deter-
mining wages in uncovered firms. This argument is reinforced by the fact that the wage
bargaining process under firm-specific contracts is highly coordinated by an industry-wide
union, whereas it is completely uncoordinated in uncovered firms. The bargaining parties
in uncovered firms therefore have an incentive to cut wages in order to gain a larger share
of industry demand, and this restricts their ability to raise wages in response to more
favourable profitability conditions. With an industry union, this competitive mechanism
completely disappears, since a central union may coordinate wage determination at the
industry level.5 For this reason, one might expect an industry union to capture a larger
share of rents under firm-specific contracts than works councils or individuals in uncovered
firms.
The extent of rent-sharing under centralised contracts ultimately depends on whether
the bargaining parties make use of flexibility provisions. If such provisions are exploited,
the extent of rent-sharing should be larger under industry-contracts than in uncovered
5We have formalised this argument elsewhere (Guertzgen 2005).
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firms. The argument here is similar to the reasoning for firm-specific contracts, since the
institutional discussion has shown that any adjustment to local conditions at the firm level
is still highly coordinated by the centralised bargaining parties. At this point, it is worth
noting that the question of whether flexibility provisions are used to adjust wages to local
profitability conditions still remains to be answered empirically. For example, even though
contractual opt-out and hardship clauses have become an important (formal) element of
centralised agreements, empirical evidence on the use of such clauses is rather scarce.
Note, in this context, that there are various reasons why unions (and possibly em-
ployers) might favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure. First, the transaction
costs incurred when adjusting wages to firm-level profitability may be high and outweigh
any gain involved with wage differentiation. Second, a further rationale for unions to
maintain a compressed wage structure might be workers’ demand for income insurance
(see Agell and Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995, Agell 2002). In our context, intra-industry
wage compression provides insurance against two dimensions of uncertainties. First, wage
compression between firms at a given point in time may reduce income risk if workers
face uncertainties over the allocation to more or less profitable firms. Second, with a com-
pressed intra-industry wage structure wage growth is likely to depend on average sector
performance, so that workers’ wages at a given employer should also be sheltered against
fluctuations in firm-level profitability over time.6 Thus, the countervailing hypothesis to
be tested is that unions suppress inter-firm wage dispersion due to heterogeneous firm
performance.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Empirical Model and Testable Hypotheses
In order to quantify the relationship between firm-specific profitability and wages across
different wage-setting regimes, we impose a wage equation taking the basic form
wit = α+(β0+βpi CENT ·CENT it+βpi DECENT ·DECENT it)·piit+γ·x′it+δ·s′it+fi+uit. (1)
Since we will use establishment level panel data, all variables are subscripted by a
establishment-index i and a time index t. The dependent variable, w, is the establishment-
6The issue of wage insurance at the firm level has been taken up recently by Guiso et al. (2005) and
Cardoso and Portela (2005). However, these empirical studies do not distinguish different bargaining
regimes.
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specific average wage per worker. The explanatory variable of main interest is pi, mea-
suring establishment-specific per-capita profitability.7 Following most of the rent-sharing
literature (see e.g. see Abowd and Lemieux 1993, van Reenen 1996), profitability, pi, is
measured by per-capita quasi-rents. We choose quasi-rents - defined as value-added mi-
nus the opportunity cost of labour - for two reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective
quasi-rents may be interpreted as representing the ’pie’ to be divided between the bar-
gaining parties. Second, from an econometric perspective, the use of quasi-rents instead
of profits enables us to circumvent the endogeneity problem induced by the accounting
relationship between wages and profits.
In eq. (1), x′ represents a (column) vector of further establishment characteristics
with a coefficient vector γ, while s′ denotes a vector of industry characteristics with
a coefficient vector δ. For s′ we include the average sectoral wage as well as industry
dummies. The latter are intended to capture industry-specific factors, such as the overall
level of industry demand and the degree of competition. The vector of establishment-
specific characteristics, x′, includes among other variables dummies for the three wage-
setting regimes since the bargaining regime is likely to affect not only the extent of rent-
sharing but also the overall wage level. Moreover, x′ contains shares of different skill
groups and shares of female workers to control for establishment-specific compositions of
the workforce. To account for unobserved differences in worker quality and differences
in technologies, further explanatory variables include firm size and the capital-labour
ratio. Establishment-specific fixed effects fi are added to eq. (1) in order to capture
unobserved time-invariant factors. Finally, time dummies are included to capture common
macroeconomic shocks, and uit is a serially uncorrelated white-noise error term.
Since the emphasis of our analysis is on the impact of different wage-setting regimes
on the sensitivity of wages to local profitability conditions, we specify interaction terms
CENTit · piit as well as DECENTit · piit,where CENT is a dummy taking the value of
unity if an establishment adopts a centralised collective wage agreement and DECENT
takes on the value of unity if a firm is party to a firm-specific collective wage contract.
Recall that according to our first hypothesis, βpi DECENT and βpi CENT should be positive,
if firm-specific contracts and flexibility provisions are used to adjust wages to local firm
performance. Conversely, testing βpi CENT = −β0 (and βpi DECENT = −β0) provides a
7Particularly in case of multi-plant firms, one might object that firm-level profitability provides a
more appropriate measure than establishment-level profitability. However, since we only have access to
the establishment-level measures, these are taken as a proxy for firm-level profitability.
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direct test of the second hypothesis, according to which unions enforce a compressed
intra-industry wage structure.
4.2 Data and Variable Description
The empirical analysis uses data from the IAB-Establishment Panel. This data set is
based on an annual survey of establishments in western Germany administered since
1993. Establishments in eastern Germany entered the panel in 1996. The data base is
a representative sample of German establishments employing at least one employee pay-
ing social security contributions. The survey data provide information on establishment
structure and performance, such as for example the aggregate wage bill, sales, size and
composition of the workforce (see e.g. Bellmann et al. 2002). Moreover, the data contain
information on whether an establishment is covered by an industry-wide collective wage
agreement, a firm-specific wage agreement or by no collective agreement at all.
In our analysis we use data for the years 1995 to 2002, since detailed information
on bargaining coverage is available only from 1995 onwards. Because information on a
number of variables, such as sales and the share of materials in total sales are gathered
retrospectively for the preceding year, we lose information on the last year. Moreover, we
restrict our sample to mining and manufacturing establishments with at least two em-
ployees. We focus on these sectors, since the introduction of opt-out and hardship clauses
has been particularly relevant in central collective wage agreements in these industries.
These sectors therefore provide a particularly interesting case for testing the empirical
relevance of the use of such clauses. As we apply dynamic panel data methods, only
establishments with consistent information on the variables of interest and at least four
consecutive time series observations are included in our sample. This results in a sample
of 661 establishments with 3,411 observations, yielding an unbalanced panel containing
establishment observations with, on average, 5.16 years of data.8
The variables used in the subsequent empirical analysis are defined as follows. The
dependent variable, w, is defined as the annual aggregate wage bill divided by the number
of employees. The number of employees and the wage bill are reported for the month
8Originally, the sample included 3,546 establishments with consistent information on all the variables
of interest. 21 observations were dropped due to suspected errors in the establishment size variable.
These observations featured per-capita values of rents of above DM 1 million. For the same reason, 81
observations with a per-capita wage bill of less than DM 8,000 were discarded from the sample. This
results in a sample of 3,515 establishments with a total of 8,617 observations. Only 661 establishments
feature at least four consecutive time-series observations.
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June, where the wage bill is defined exclusive of employers’ mandatory social security
contributions as well as fringe benefits. Per capita quasi-rents are constructed as the
difference between annual sales, material costs and the alternative annual wage bill divided
by establishment size, so that
pi =
SALES −MATERIALCOST − w · SIZE
SIZE
. (2)
Establishment size (SIZE) is calculated as the reported number of employees averaged
over the present and preceding year. The alternative wage bill, w · SIZE, is defined as
the annual wage bill which each establishment would incur if it had to pay the average
industrial wage. Thus, we approximate w by the weighted average of industry-specific
annual wages (separately for eastern and western Germany) for blue- and white-collar
workers with the weights being the establishment-specific shares of those worker groups
in the total work force. All monetary values are expressed as real values by deflating
them with a sector-specific producer price index normalised to 1 in 2000. Industry-specific
price indices and wages are obtained from the Federal Statistical Office Germany and are
matched to the establishment data on the basis of a two-digit sector classification.
Further variables include the share of high-skilled workers (defined as skilled white-
collar workers), the share of skilled blue-collar workers, the share of female workers and
the share of apprentices in the total work force. Because we do not directly observe the
capital stock, we need to construct a proxy. We measure capital by using the perpetual
inventory method starting from the capital value in the first observation year and using
the information on expansion investment in the following years. The initial capital value
is proxied by dividing investment expenditures in each establishment’s first observation
year by a pre-period growth rate of investment, g, and a depreciation rate of capital, δ.9
Capital-stocks in subsequent periods are calculated by adding real expansion investment
expenditures.10 To obtain real values, nominal investment expenditures are deflated by
the producer price index of investment goods of the Federal Statistical Office Germany.
The capital-labour ratio, K/L, is constructed by dividing the resulting capital proxy by
establishment size. An ownership dummy variable indicates whether the establishment is
9This involves the assumption that investment expenditures on capital have grown at a constant
average rate, g, so that the capital stock in the base year is K1 = I0 + (1 − δ)I−1 + (1 − δ)2I−2 + ... =
I1
∑∞
s=0[
1−δ
1+g ]
s = I1/(δ + g). In particular, to calculate K1, we set δ = 0.1 and g = 0.05 (see Hempell
2005).
10More specifically, Kt = Kt−1(1 − δ) + It−1 = Kt−1 + EIt−1,where Kt is the capital stock at the
beginning of period t, i.e. at the end of period t− 1, and EIt are expansion investment expenditures in
period t.
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part of a company owned by persons with unlimited liabilities. Table A1 in the appendix
contains a summary of all establishment covariates.
Table 1 presents sample statistics for the main variables used in the subsequent anal-
ysis. The figures disclose that quasi-rents vary considerably more than average wages.
With respect to collective bargaining coverage, the fraction of observations covered by an
industry-wide wage agreement amounts to about 62 per cent, while the fraction of obser-
vations with a firm-specific agreement is only 11 per cent. 27 per cent of all observations
are subject to no agreement at all. Breaking down the sample into those establishments
adopting an industry-wide agreement, a firm-specific agreement and into those without
any bargaining coverage reveals that average wages are highest under industry-wide agree-
ments and lowest without bargaining coverage (see Table A2a in the Appendix). The
variability in wages is higher in uncovered establishments with a coefficient of variation of
0.46 as compared to 0.32 and 0.33 in covered establishments. Moreover, establishments
under centralised agreements outperform those under firm-specific contracts and those
without bargaining coverage in terms of per-capita quasi-rents. Establishments adopting
industry-wide agreements also have more employees and exhibit the largest fraction of
high-skilled workers, while establishments without bargaining coverage employ on average
more women than those covered by a collective wage agreement. Finally, establishments
with firm-specific contracts feature the largest capital-labour ratio.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Estimation Strategy
We first focus on a simple static pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) specification
of eq. (1). The POLS estimations serve as a benchmark case and will be modified
in various respects: first, we address the possibility of unobserved establishment-specific
time invariant factors. In our context, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity may result
from neglected capital costs in the rent measure as well as from differences in technological
conditions11 and worker quality that are not captured by our control variables. As such
unobserved factors are likely to be correlated with our profitability measure, simple POLS
estimates may be expected to yield biased estimates of βpi. A second problem concerns
11With respect to differences in technologies, establishment-specific fixed effects capture e.g. production
processes that provide firms with higher rents and which may require compensating wage differentials
(e.g. processes involving dangerous work). Such differences might lead to a positive wage-rent correlation
which would not be due to rent-sharing (see e.g. Margolis and Salvanes 2001).
10
Page 49 of 74
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Variable Definition Mean Std.-Dev. Obs.
w Per-capita wage bill 49.74 18.84 3,411
pi Per-capita quasi-rents 70.57 94.59 3,411
w Alternative wage 51.19 11.57 3,411
HIGHSHARE Share of skilled white-collar workers 0.25 0.20 3,411
BLUESHARE Share of skilled blue-collar workers 0.42 0.23 3,411
APPSHARE Share of apprentices 0.05 0.06 3,411
FEMSHARE Share of female workers 0.27 0.21 3,411
SIZE Establishment size 605.80 2505.35 3,411
CENT Centralised collective agreement 0.62 0.49 3,411
DECENT Firm-specific collective agreement 0.11 0.32 3,411
WCOUNCIL Works council 0.64 0.48 3,411
K/L Capital-labour ratio 249.94 1344.08 3,411
EAST Eastern Germany 0.42 0.49 3,411
OWN Private ownership 0.21 0.41 3,411
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel 1995-2002. Entries are unweighted.
Note: All monetary values are measured in DM 1,000 whereby 1 e corresponds to DM 1.95583.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
the endogeneity of per-capita rents. A first source of bias is a standard simultaneity bias
which occurs if wages, output and quasi-rents are jointly determined. In general, the
direction of bias can go either way and largely depends on the underlying relationship
between output and employment (see Abowd and Lemieux 1993). In addition, because
alternative wages and establishment wages are likely to be positively correlated, there will
always be some source of downward bias. Third, we consider more dynamic specifications
and include lagged wages and rents as explaining variables in our wage regression. The
inclusion of lagged rent measures and lagged wages is meant to allow for possible dynamics
in the reaction of wages to profitability conditions and sluggish adjustment of wages.
4.3.2 Pooled OLS-Results
Table 2 reports results from POLS estimations of the impact of quasi-rents per worker on
wages. The variables are specified in levels rather than logs, since the use of logs would have
required discarding all observations with negative quasi-rents. The estimate of quasi-rents
per employee on the average wage is 0.042 when including only the alternative wage in
the regression. Adding worker characteristics reduces the coefficient to 0.036, suggesting
that around 14 per cent of the correlation between rents and wages is due to systematic
sorting of workers across establishments (Model (2)). In particular, high-qualified workers
appear to be associated with more profitable establishments. The effects of rents on wages
11
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are further reduced if other establishment characteristics, such as establishment size,
bargaining coverage, the existence of a works council and ownership status are included
(Model (3)). Apart from APPSHARE (fraction of apprentices), the capital-labour ratio
K/L andDECENT , all control variables enter the regression with their expected sign and
are all significant at conventional levels. Establishment size is found to have a significant
positive effect on average wages, a result which is consistent with earlier evidence.12 In the
literature, various explanations have been advanced for a positive relationship between
firm size and wages, such as differences in profits, capital equipment, worker quality and
monitoring costs among others (e.g. Oi and Idson 1999). As we control explicitly for
differences in the work force composition, the capital-labour ratio and quasi-rents, the
establishment size variable may be interpreted as capturing some part of unobserved
worker quality and technology differences.
In Model (4), the inclusion of industry and time dummies leaves the coefficient on
rents largely unchanged. Adding industry and time dummies changes the coefficient
on the capital-labour ratio to its expected sign, indicating some systematic differences
in capital-intensities across industries. Including an east-west dummy does not change
the coefficient on rents either (Model (5)). As far as the bargaining coverage effects
are concerned, the coefficients on centralised contracts are always significantly positive,
whereas decentralised contracts seem to have no significant impact on wages. In addition
to the collective bargaining regime, we control for the existence of a works council, which,
in line with earlier studies (see e.g. Addison et al. 2001, Hu¨bler and Jirjahn 2003), are
found to exert a positive impact on averages wages.
Finally, our main interest concerns the question whether the rent-coefficient differs
systematically across the three wage-setting structures. Model (6) includes interactions
between collective bargaining coverage and quasi-rents. The inclusion of interactions
leads to a larger and more precise estimate of the coefficient on the dummy for firm-
level agreements (DECENT ). In sum, the results indicate that the extent to which
wages react to local profitability conditions is significantly lower in establishments that
are covered by a collective wage agreement. Even in establishments covered by a firm-
specific contract wages appear to be less sensitive to rents. Moreover, the adoption of a
centralised wage agreement seems to reduce the magnitude of rent-sharing to a slightly
larger extent, as a Wald-Test of βpi CENT = βpi DECENT can be rejected at the 10 per cent
12For German evidence on employer size effects see e.g. Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) and Gerlach
and Hu¨bler (1998).
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
pi 0.042∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
pi∗ CENT -0.042∗∗∗
(0.010)
pi∗ DECENT -0.030∗∗∗
(0.012)
w 0.992∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.065) (0.064)
HIGHSHARE 11.484∗∗∗ 7.420∗∗∗ 6.727∗∗∗ 10.179∗∗∗ 9.952∗∗∗
(1.721) (1.572) (1.644) (1.953) (1.923)
BLUESHARE 1.433 2.206∗∗ 4.308∗∗∗ 4.862∗∗∗ 4.830∗∗∗
(1.207) (1.098) (1.117) (1.146) (1.148)
APPSHARE -3.183 3.392 7.628∗∗ 1.841 1.980
(3.626) (3.215) (3.525) (3.922) (3.901)
FEMSHARE -17.374∗∗∗ -14.990∗∗∗ -15.339∗∗∗ -15.484∗∗∗ -15.370∗∗∗
(1.225) (1.107) (1.250) (1.245) (1.233)
SIZE 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
SIZE2 -2.17e−08∗ -3.03e−08∗∗∗ -2.94e−08∗∗ -2.91e−08∗∗
(1.19e−08) (1.16e−08) (1.17e−08) (1.18e−08)
CENT 3.772∗∗∗ 4.045∗∗∗ 3.692∗∗∗ 5.619∗∗∗
(0.613) (0.628) (0.635) (0.700)
DECENT 0.671 1.195 1.046 2.058∗∗
(0.754) (0.745) (0.744) (0.886)
WCOUNCIL 7.149∗∗∗ 7.401∗∗∗ 7.116∗∗∗ 7.033∗∗∗
(0.632) (0.631) (0.632) (0.627)
K/L -6.57e−06 0.0002∗ 0.0002 0.0002
(-9.55e−05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
OWN -4.108∗∗∗ -4.267∗∗∗ -4.225∗∗∗ -4.189∗∗∗
(0.535) (0.539) (0.534) (0.534)
EAST -2.849∗∗∗ -2.803∗∗∗
(0.995) (0.988)
Ind.-/Time No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.482 0.522 0.597 0.610 0.610 0.615
Observations 3,411 3,411 3,411 3,411 3,411 3,411
Establishments 661 661 661 661 661 661
Note: The dependent variable is the aggregate per-capita wage bill. Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Models (4) - (6) include time dummies
and 15 industry dummies.
∗Significant at 10%-level ∗∗ Significant at 5%-level ∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level.
Table 2: Pooled OLS regression results
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level (with a p−value of 0.078). However, the null hypotheses of β0 = −βpi CENT and
β0 = −βpi DECENT are also rejected (with p−values close to zero), suggesting that the
overall impact of rents on wages is still positive under both regimes.
4.3.3 Dynamic Specifications
This section addresses potential econometric problems, such as the possibility of unob-
served establishment-specific time invariant factors as well as the endogeneity of rents.
A further possible endogenous regressor is firm size, as higher wages are likely to induce
firms to reduce their labour force. To allow for sluggish adjustment of wages and time lags
in the response of wages to profitability conditions, we add lagged wages and quasi-rents
as explanatory variables to our regression. The wage equation then takes the following
form
wit = α + βwwit−1 +
K∑
k=0
βpit−k · piit−k + γ · x′it + δ · s′it + fi + uit, (3)
where the coefficients βpit−k are specified as in eq. (1). First differencing eq. (3)
eliminates time-invariant establishment-specific effects.13 In eq. (3), first differencing
causes the lagged dependent variable ∆wit−1 to become correlated with the error term
∆uit, so that it is necessary to instrument lagged wages. In the absence of second-order
correlation in the error term, wit−2 and earlier lags provide suitable instruments, since
they do not correlate with ∆uit. Because r nts, their interactions with the wage-setting
regimes and establishment size are likely to be endogenous, they are to be instrumented
as well. As with the lagged dependent variable, suitable candidates are lagged rents and
establishment size in t− 2 and earlier provided they do not enter eq. (3) as explanatory
variables. Since this might be particularly relevant for lagged rents, we test for the
significance of rents up to t− 2.
To estimate eq. (3), we first apply the differenced Generalized Methods of Moments
(GMM) estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator exploits
all available moment conditions around the error term as specified above. Apart from
instrumenting endogenous and lagged dependent variables by their lagged values in t− 2,
the GMM estimator provides an appropriate treatment of predetermined variables which
13First-differenced estimates of specification (6) in Table 2 yield rent-coefficients of 0.025, -0.034 and
-0.018 with standard errors of 0.013, 0.015 and 0.014 (for no-coverage, interactions with centralised
contracts and firm-specific contracts, respectively), suggesting a considerable upward bias of the POLS
estimates. For the sake of expositional brevity, we do not report the full first-differenced specifications.
The estimates are available on request.
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are assumed to be uncorrelated with uit and uit+1, but are correlated with uit−1. As first
differencing causes such variables to become correlated with the error term ∆uit, they are
instrumented by lagged values in t−1 and earlier. In particular, we allow all human capital
variables, the capital-labour ratio and the alternative wage to be predetermined in order to
capture potential feedback effects from wages in period t on those covariates in subsequent
periods. To test the validity of the moment conditions, we present the Sargan/Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions. This test statistic calculates the correlation of the error
terms with the instrument matrix and has an asymptotic χ2 distribution under the null
that the moment conditions are valid. Moreover, we report diagnostics for second-order
serial correlation of the error terms (testing the null of no second-order serial correlation).
It is important to note that the GMM estimator may also help to reduce a potential
endogeneity problem that arises from measurement error. Measurement error is likely
to be of major importance since the dependent variable, the average wage, and some
of the explanatory variables, such as quasi-rents as well as establishment size, are con-
structed using some of the same quantities (in particular the employment level). As a
result, measurement error in these variables can induce spurious correlations between
these explanatory variables and the dependent variable.
Table A3 in the Appendix gives the results of the differenced GMM estimates.14 While
Model (1) contains the static specification, Model (2) contains the simplest dynamic spec-
ification adding solely the lagged wage to the explanatory variables. Model (3) addition-
ally includes lagged rents, while Model (4) contains lags of rents up to t − 2. Table A3
contains estimates for time-varying regressors only, since first-differencing eliminates all
time-invariant explanatory variables.15 Turning to the main variables of interest, the signs
of the rent-coefficients exhibit the same pattern as the POLS estimates of Model (6) in
Table 2. While the rent-coefficient is always significantly positive for uncovered establish-
ments, wages appear to be less sensitive to rents in establishments that are covered by a
collective wage agreement. Including the lagged wage as a further explanatory variable
in Model (2) reduces the rent-coefficients somewhat. As mentioned earlier, using lagged
rents in t − 2 as instruments for contemporaneous rents requires that they do not enter
eq. (3) as explanatory variables. To check the robustness of our findings, we therefore
include lagged rents up to t − 2 in Model (3) and (4). While lags of rents in t − 1 are
14All estimations have been carried out using the ”XTABOND2”-procedure in STATA 8.0 SE.
15In our sample, time-invariant variables are the ownership dummy, the east-west dummy and the
industry dummies. The collective bargaining dummies and the works council dummy are time varying
binary regressors.
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found to be insignificant in Model (3), lagged rents in t− 2 enter Model (4) significantly,
indicating that wages do not only respond to contemporary establishment performance,
but also to past profitability conditions. In specifications (3) and (4), the effects of (con-
temporaneous) rents on wages in uncovered establishments are reduced, but still remain
significant, once lagged rents up to t − 2 are controlled for. The last rows in the second
part of Table A3 show that all specifications pass the test of overidentifying restrictions
and the AR(2)-test. The last two rows in the first part of Table A3 report p-values of
Wald-statistics testing the null of β0 = −βpi CENT and β0 = −βpi DECENT for the con-
temporaneous rent coefficients. The values indicate that wages appear to be completely
insensitive to profitability conditions in establishments that are covered by a collective
agreement, irrespective of whether the agreement is industry or firm-specific.
With respect to the remaining covariates, the performance of the differenced GMM
estimates turns out to be rather unsatisfactory: although the lagged wage enters specifica-
tion (2) and (3) with its expected sign, it is not significant and its point estimates appear
to be implausibly low. In Model (4), the estimate is even negative. In all specifications,
establishment size and the works council dummy are always insignificant and for the most
part incorrectly signed. The capital-labour ratio is found to be significant, but with a
negative sign. As regards the workforce composition, the estimates of HIGHSHARE
and APPSHARE also seem to be poorly determined, as they enter almost all regressions
with an unexpected sign. The remaining controls for the workforce composition enter with
their expected sign (except for BLUESHARE in Model (1)), but are not statistically
significant.
In light of the poor performance of the differenced GMM estimates, Table A4 reports
results using the System-GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bover
(1995). This estimator is motivated by the problem that lagged levels of a variable are
likely to be weak instruments for the equation in first-differences if the individual time
series exhibits near unit root properties. Closer inspection of the time-series properties
of the explanatory variables reveals that particularly the size variable and the capital-
labour ratio appear to be close to a random walk.16 The SYS-GMM estimator exploits
additional moment conditions for the equation in levels using lagged differences as instru-
ments in the levels equation. In particular, predetermined variables are instrumented by
contemporaneous first-differences in the levels equation, whereas endogenous and lagged
16SYS-GMM estimates of a simple AR(1)-process yield a coefficient of about 0.94 for establishment
size and of 0.91 for the capital-labour ratio.
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dependent variables are instrumented by lagged first-differences (Bond 2002). To test the
additional moment conditions implied by the SYS-GMM estimator as compared to the
differenced GMM estimates in Table A3, we present in each column difference tests which
refer to the respective specifications in Table A3. The test statistics are calculated as
the differences between the Sargan/Hansen statistics of the SYS-GMM and those of the
differenced GMM estimates and have an asymptotic χ2 distribution under the null that
the additional moment restrictions are valid.
Overall, the SYS-GMM estimates appear to be more satisfactory than the differenced
GMM results. The lagged wage enters all specifications with its expected sign and its
estimates are considerably higher than the differenced GMM estimates, suggesting that
the latter are severely downward biased. In all specifications, establishment size is found
to have a significantly positive impact on average wages and is estimated much more
precisely than in the differenced GMM specification. This is consistent with the random-
walk property of this variable, indicating that the lagged level of establishment size is a
weak instrument for first-differences.
From the human capital covariates, only FEMSHARE and BLUESHARE enter
all regressions with their expected sign. The remaining worker controls are mostly incor-
rectly signed and not significant. Turning to the impact of rents on average wages, the
estimates offer a similar picture as the differenced GMM results: in uncovered establish-
ments, quasi-rents exert a positive impact on wages, while wages are generally found to
be less sensitive to rents in establishments that are covered by a collective wage agree-
ment. In all specifications, a Wald-Test fails to reject the null of β0 = −βpi CENT and
β0 = −βpi DECENT . Similar to the differenced GMM estimates, the effects of contempora-
neous quasi-rents on wages in uncovered establishments are further reduced but remain
still significant, once lagged wages and lagged quasi-rents up to t − 1 are controlled for.
However, controlling for lagged rents up to t− 2 leads to an insignificant rent-coefficient
in uncovered establishments, which is slightly lower than that obtained by the differenced
GMM estimates (Model (4)). All specifications pass the test of overidentifying restric-
tions and the AR(2)-test. Moreover, the difference Sargan/Hansen statistic testing the
additional moment restrictions as compared to Table A3 confirms their validity in all
specifications except for Model (3) (with a p−value of 0.056).
Finally, all specifications were re-run assuming that all predetermined explanatory
variables are uncorrelated with the time-invariant establishment-specific effect. At least
17
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in specification (4), this causes all human capital and establishment covariates to enter
with their expected sign. However, the remaining results from these regressions only differ
slightly from those shown in Table A4, so that we do not report them here. Most impor-
tantly, the estimates of the rent-coefficients are very similar to Table A4. In specifications
(2) to (4), a Wald-Test again fails to reject the null of a zero-coefficient on contempo-
raneous rents under centralised as well as firm-specific agreements (β0 = −βpi CENT and
β0 = −βpi DECENT ). Only in Model (1), can the null of a zero-coefficient be rejected under
centralised agreements at the 10 per cent level (with a p−value of 0.068). The coefficients
on contemporaneous rents in uncovered establishments are slightly larger than those in
Table A4, ranging between 0.095 in Model (1) and 0.056 in Model (4).
Comparing the GMM estimates of the rent-sharing coefficients to the POLS estimates
reveals that the POLS estimates still yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient
in covered establishments, whereas the SYS-GMM-results accounting for unobserved het-
erogeneity and endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero. This finding
is indicative of the presence of unobserved factors in covered establishments which are pos-
itively correlated with profits and impact positively upon wages. One such factor may be
that a compressed wage structure under centralised wage contracts causes firms to up-
grade the quality of their workforce. This might lead to higher unobserved worker quality
in such firms and therefore to upward-biased estimates in the simple POLS-specification.
Comparing the GMM estimates of the rent-sharing coefficients to the POLS estimates in
uncovered establishments points to similar figures. While the POLS-coefficient in uncov-
ered establishments amounts to 0.061, the SYS-GMM estimates range between 0.044 and
0.095. Given these coefficients and mean wages and quasi-rents per employee of 38.78
and 37.15 in uncovered establishments, the elasticity of the average wage with respect to
contemporaneous quasi-rents is of the magnitude 0.042 to 0.091. How do these results
compare to other estimates for Germany? Hu¨bler and Ko¨nig (1998) use data from the
Hanover establishment panel and report an elasticity of about 0.12, while Klodt (2000:
pp.172-182) finds an elasticity of 0.14 using the same data set. Compared to these fig-
ures, our estimate of the contemporaneous rent-coefficient in uncovered establishments
therefore appears to be rather low. However, it needs to be emphasised that these stud-
ies do not allow the rent-coefficient to vary with collective bargaining coverage. Given
the variability of rents, our results suggest that the quantitative role of rent-sharing in
wage determination is nevertheless substantial: calculating the share of variance in the
distribution of wages due to the variability in rents, it can be shown that the variability
18
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in per-capita rents explains about 15.7 to 33.9 per cent of the variability in (average)
establishment wages.17
For centralised wage-agreements, the invariance of wages against establishment-specific
profitability indicates that the fraction of establishments making use of flexibility provi-
sions seems to be rather negligible. Even though firms may pay wages above the going
rate and may adopt opt-out clauses, this potential for adjustments to local profitability
conditions appears to be largely unused.18 Even more striking is the invariance of wages
against local profits in establishments that are subject to a firm-specific wage contract.
Although this result is to be interpreted with caution as the number of observations with
a firm-specific wage contract is rather small, it does not seem to confirm our first hypoth-
esis which led us to expect the sensitivity of wages to profits under firm-specific contracts
to be larger than in uncovered establishments. In sum, these findings lend support to
our second hypothesis that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and
suppress inter-firm wage differentials.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Sample Selection
The use of dynamic panel data methods imposes strong restrictions on the size of our final
sample, since we have to exclude all establishments featuring less than 4 consecutive time
series observations. Tables A2a and A2b in the Appendix compare sample statistics for
the original sample and the final sample used in the preceding analysis. The figures show
that establishments subject to a collective contract are on average considerably larger and
more capital-intensive in the final sample than in the original sample. The differences for
uncovered establishments mainly concern the qualification structure, with a larger fraction
of qualified blue-collar employees in the final sample as compared to the original statistics.
It is clear that this sample selection might bias our estimates, although the direction of
bias is not clear a-priori. For example, unions might want to suppress rent-sharing in
17This calculation is performed under the assumption that 95 per cent of the mass of a symmetric
distribution is within plus or minus 2 standard deviations of the mean. The contribution of the variability
of rents to the variability of wages can then be calculated as:
βpi(pi+2σpi)−βpi(pi−2σpi)
(w+2σw)−(w−2σw) =
βpi·σpi
σw
(see e.g. Margolis and Salvanes 2001).
18This finding corroborates the results of Franz and Pfeiffer (2003), which are based on an employer
survey of about 800 German firms. Their results indicate that only 18 per cent of those employers that
covered by a collective contract allowing for hardship clauses make use of such provisions.
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large establishments due to high transaction costs. Efficiency wage considerations, which
might also play a role in explaining a positive profit effect, lead us to expect the wage-
profit correlation to increase with establishment size and capital-intensity. To assess the
importance and direction of bias involved with our sample selection, we re-ran the POLS
regressions using the original sample of 3,515 establishments.
Re-running the POLS regressions separately by bargaining coverage on the original
sample gives point estimates of the rent-coefficients of 0.045, 0.020 and 0.024 (for no-
coverage, centralised contracts and firm-specific contracts, respectively) as compared to
0.071, 0.013 and 0.032 for the final sample. However, the differences in the rent-coefficient
are statistically significant only for uncovered establishments. This leads us to conclude
that for covered establishments our results are fairly robust to sample selection, whereas
the selection appears to involve an upward bias of the rent-coefficient for uncovered estab-
lishments. Note that this might be caused by the differences in qualification structures.
If rent-sharing is more relevant for qualified blue-collar workers, then the overrepresenta-
tion of establishments employing large fractions of such employees in the final sample will
bias the extent of rent-sharing upwards. However, it should be noted that this does not
affect the robustness of our results concerning the overall pattern of wage responses, since
for uncovered establishments the rent-coefficient is estimated to be significantly positive,
whereas wages in covered establishments are still found to be completely invariant against
establishment-specific profitability conditions.
5.2 Alternative Interpretations of the Correlation betweenWages
and Rents
Several authors have emphasised that a positive correlation between quasi-rents and wages
need not necessarily imply rent-sharing, but may simply reflect movements of labour
demand along an upward sloping labour supply curve (see e.g. Blanchflower et al. 1996,
van Reenen 1996, Hildreth and Oswald 1997). If this were the case, the inclusion of the
employment level should render the coefficient on quasi-rents insignificant. For uncovered
establishments we are able to rule out such an alternative interpretation, since the positive
coefficient on quasi-rents is robust to the inclusion of establishment size as an explanatory
variable in all regressions. As a further robustness check we have also included employment
growth a proxy for demand shocks in the differenced GMM regressions, which left the
20
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coefficients on quasi-rents also largely unchanged.19
5.3 Endogeneity of the Bargaining Regime
Thus far, we have considered the collective bargaining regime as exogenous. However,
in Germany firms may leave their employers’ associations and may, thus, to some extent
influence the choice of the bargaining regime. This shows up in our data, where the
share of sample establishments subject to a centralised contract declined from 82 per cent
in 1995 to 75 per cent in 2001, and the fraction of establishments with a firm-specific
agreement decreased from 8.5 to 6 per cent. What is relevant for our estimates is that a
non-random selection into the regimes might bias our rent-sharing coefficients, particularly
if a firm’s choice is correlated with its profitability conditions. If, for example, centralised
contracts shelter firms against excessive rent-sharing at the firm level, highly profitable
firms might systematically select themselves into the centralised regime. To check the
robustness of our findings to the endogeneity of the collective bargaining regime, we first
estimate eq. (1) separately by bargaining coverage using a selection model which accounts
for a potential non-random selection into the three wage determination regimes. To assess
the importance of a potential endogeneity bias, we subsequently compare the estimates
with the corresponding POLS regression results. Defining regimes R1, R2 and R3 as
wage determination under no-coverage, centralised contracts and firm-specific contracts,
respectively, the wage equations for each regime Rj, j = 1, 2, 3, become
wj = αj + βjpi · pij + γj · x′j + δj · s′j + uj if Rj = 1, (4)
where the variance of uj is given by σ
2 and the indices i, t are suppressed for exposi-
tional convenience. To account for E(uj|Rj = 1), we adopt an extension of the two-step
selection-bias correction method developed by Heckman (1979), which has been proposed
by Lee (1983). Assuming that selectivity into the regimes can be modelled as a multino-
mial logit with a vector of explanatory variables z′ and a parameter vector θj, Lee (1983)
shows that
E(w|Rj = 1) = αj + βjpi · pij + γj · x′j + δj · s′j − σρjλj(θj · z′). (5)
where
λj( θj · z′) = φ(Φ
−1(Pj))
Pj
, j = 1, 2, 3 and Pj =
exp(θj · z′)∑
k
exp(θk · z′) , j, k = 1, 2, 3, (6)
19The results are not reported here, but are available on request.
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and with ρj denoting the correlation-coefficient between uj and the unobservables in
the selection equation. From eq. (5) it can be seen that OLS estimates of eq. (4) are
biased if λj(θj · z′) is correlated with the observables in eq. (4) and uj and the error
term in the selection equation are correlated. Consistent estimates of all parameters of
interest in eq. (5) may be obtained by a two-step procedure, where the first step involves
the generation of predicted values of λj(θj ·z′) by estimating the selection equation using
a multinomial logit approach. In the second step, the predicted values are added to eq.
(4), which is estimated by OLS. In the selection equation, the vector of observables z′
includes the observables in eq. (4) and further identifying covariates which are excluded
from eq. (4). For the excluded observables, we choose (1) a dummy taking on the value of
unity if an establishment belongs to a publicly listed company and (2) an establishment-
age dummy indicating whether an establishment has been founded after 1990 or earlier.
We believe that those variables provide appropriate identifying exclusion restrictions for
several reasons. First, when testing the significance of those variables in eq. (4) estimated
separately by bargaining coverage, the corresponding F -tests indicate that both variables
have no direct significant impact on wages (with p-values of 0.18, 0.24 and 0.44). Second,
the identifying variables all appear to be significant predictors of the bargaining regime,
since the corresponding F -statistic is highly significant in the selection equation (with a
p-value close to zero). Third, we argue that it is reasonable to assume that the identifying
variables are exogenous in the selection equation, since they are unlikely to be influenced
by unobservables affecting the bargaining regime.
Table A5 in the Appendix shows the POLS estimates and the selectivity-corrected
estimates using the original sample of 3,515 establishments. The negative coefficients on
λj(θj · z′), which are estimates of −σρj, indicate that the choice of collective contracts is
endogenous, with the error term in the selection equation and uj being positively corre-
lated. In the uncovered regime, the coefficient on λj(θj ·z′) is positive, but not significantly
different from zero. The direction of bias under collective contracts depends on the corre-
lation between λj(θj · z′) and the covariates in eq. (4). Given that λj(θj · z′) is decreasing
in Pj and in all covariates that have a positive impact on Pj, the negative estimates of
−σρj suggest that the OLS-coefficients on covariates that are positively correlated with
the choice of either centralised or firm-specific contracts should be upward biased. Multi-
nomial logit estimates show that the log-odds ratio of choosing centralised contracts as
compared to no-coverage increases significantly with quasi-rents.20 By contrast, the ef-
20The results are not reported here, but are available on request.
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fect of quasi-rents on the log-odds ratio of choosing firm-specific contracts as compared
to no-coverage is found to be insignificant. The resulting marginal effects of quasi-rents
on centralised contracts, firm-specific contracts and no-coverage are 0.0002, -0.00003 and
-0.0002. Given the estimated coefficients on λj(θj · z′), we expect that correcting for
selectivity should make little difference under no-coverage and firm-specific contracts,
and should lead to a decline in the coefficient under centralised contracts. Indeed, the
selectivity-corrected rent-sharing coefficient is found to be slightly lower for centralised
contracts than the corresponding OLS coefficient. As selectivity plays no major role for
the uncovered regime, most of the selectivity-corrected estimates do not substantially dif-
fer from the OLS estimates. If a selectivity correction changes anything at all, it results
in even smaller rent coefficients under centralised contracts. In sum, this leads us to con-
clude that the overall pattern of rent-sharing across the three wage determination regimes
appears to be quite robust to the endogeneity of the bargaining regime.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper was twofold: first, we addressed the question of whether German
wages respond to firm-specific profitability conditions and second, we explored the extent
to which the sensitivity of wages to firm profits depends on collective bargaining coverage.
The institutional discussion has shown that firm-specific contracts and flexibility provi-
sions under centralised contracts provide a means to adjust wages to local conditions at
the firm level and that such adjustments are generally influenced by industry-wide unions
which may retain control over centralised union objectives. Provided those flexibility pro-
visions are used, bargaining power considerations lead us to expect wages to react more
strongly to local conditions in firms that are covered by a collective contract than in un-
covered firms. However, there are various reasons why unions might not want to adjust
wages to local firm performance, such as high transaction costs or workers’ demand for
income insurance. We therefore take our empirical findings as a test of whether flexibility
provisions are really exploited or whether unions suppress inter-firm wage dispersion due
to heterogeneous firm performance.
Using data from the IAB-Establishment Panel, the results of our empirical analysis
offer a remarkably consistent picture: in general, rent-sharing is found to be an empiri-
cally relevant phenomenon in Germany. However, the extent of rent-sharing seems to be
significantly lower in establishments that are subject to a collective wage agreement - irre-
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spective of whether the agreement is industry or firm-specific. While POLS estimates still
yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments, GMM-
results accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents point to a
rent-sharing coefficient of zero. This finding is indicative of the presence of unobserved
factors in covered establishments which are positively correlated with profits and impact
positively upon wages. One such factor may be that a compressed intra-firm wage struc-
ture under collective wage contracts causes establishments to upgrade the quality of their
workforce. This might lead to higher unobserved worker productivity in such establish-
ments and therefore to upward-biased estimates in the simple POLS-specification. Finally,
we find the pattern of rent-sharing to be robust to sample selection and the endogeneity
of the bargaining regime.
For centralised wage agreements, the invariance of wages against local profits suggests
that the use of flexibility provisions in central wage agreements appears to be empirically
negligible. Even though firms may pay wages above the going rate and may make use
of opt-out clauses, the potential for adjustments to local profitability conditions appears
to be largely unused. A similar result holds for wage determination under firm-specific
wage contracts. As such contracts are generally concluded by industry-specific unions,
one possible explanation might be that a considerable fraction of firm-specific contracts
simply adopts wage bargains negotiated in the corresponding industry agreement. Taken
together, our results seem to support the notion that unions favour a compressed intra-
industry wage structure and suppress firm-level rent-sharing, either due to workers’ de-
mand for income insurance or due to high transaction costs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Construction of Establishment Variables
Variable Definition
w: Annual aggregate wage bill∗) ( = 12*wage bill reported for the month June)
divided by the number of employees reported for the month June.
SIZE Number of employees reported for the month June averaged
over the present and preceding year.
pi: Quasi-rents are constructed by subtracting material costs and the alternative
wage bill from annual sales. Per capita values are obtained by dividing
quasi-rents by establishment size. Nominal values are deflated by a sector-
specific (two-digit) producer price index.
w The average annual sectoral wage per worker is approximated by the
weighted average of industry-specific wages for blue and white-collar
workers (separately for western and eastern Germany), with the weights
being the establishment-specific shares of those worker groups in the total
work force. Average hourly industrial wages of blue-collar workers are
converted into monthly wages by multiplying them with establishment-
specific average working time. Information on average sectoral wages
of white-collar workers is available only on a monthly basis. Monthly values
are converted into annual values by multiplying them with the factor 12.
Table A1: Description of establishment variables
... to be continued on next page
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...continue Table A1
Variable Definition
K/L Constructed by using the perpetual inventory method starting from the
capital value in the first observation year and using the information on
expansion investments. The initial capital value is proxied by dividing
investment expenditures in each establishment’s first observation year
by a pre-period growth rate of investment, g, and a depreciation rate
of capital, d.∗∗) Capital-stocks in subsequent periods are calculated by
adding real expansion investment expenditures. Nominal investment
expenditures are deflated by the producer price index of investment goods
of the Federal Statistical Office Germany. The capital-labour ratio is con-
structed by dividing the resulting capital proxy by establishment size.
WCOUNCIL Dummy=1 if works council is present. In some waves (1995 and 1997)
only those plants who enter the panel are asked to report the existence
of a works council. For the remaining establishments the missing
information is imputed based upon the information in the following year.
DECENT Dummy=1 if establishment is bound to a firm-specific agreement.
CENT Dummy=1 if establishment is bound to a industry-specific agreement.
OWN Dummy=1 if establishment is part of a company that is owned by a person
with unlimited liabilities.
Note: ∗) Exclusive of employers’ social security contributions as well as fringe benefits.
∗∗) To calculate the capital stock in the first period, we set d=0.1 and g=0.05
Table A1: Description of establishment variables
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A.2 Descriptive Statistics by Bargaining Coverage
CENT DECENT NO-COVERAGE
Variables Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
w 54.64 17.66 48.37 16.04 38.78 17.95
pi 85.14 102.28 68.40 90.40 37.15 64.13
w 53.42 10.87 49.63 10.93 46.61 11.97
HIGHSHARE 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.19
BLUESHARE 0.39 0.22 0.47 0.23 0.48 0.25
APPSHARE 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07
FEMSHARE 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.29 0.24
SIZE 865.33 3,123.63 417.65 870.11 75.81 161.27
WCOUNCIL 0.80 0.40 0.75 0.44 0.24 0.43
K/L 204.85 400.02 721.65 3,780.18 150.59 385.72
EAST 0.29 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.68 0.47
OWN 0.20 0.40 0.12 0.32 0.28 0.45
Obs. 2,120 392 899
Table A2a: Final sample
CENT DECENT NO-COVERAGE
Variables Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
w 53.80 19.02 47.65 18.53 38.68 18.24
pi 81.95 103.10 71.42 106.92 40.26 74.40
w 53.74 10.95 50.06 11.29 48.46 12.15
HIGHSHARE 0.26 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.21
BLUESHARE 0.39 0.22 0.46 0.24 0.45 0.26
APPSHARE 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08
FEMSHARE 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.21 0.31 0.25
SIZE 650.80 2,214.64 366.84 1,019.92 72.09 161.91
WCOUNCIL 0.75 0.43 0.69 0.46 0.21 0.41
K/L 177.55 381.70 405.84 2,537.03 140.07 362.74
EAST 0.27 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.66 0.47
OWN 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.33 0.47
Obs. 4,751 892 2,974
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel 1995-2002. Entries are unweighted.
Note: All monetary values are measured in DM 1,000. 1 e corresponds to DM 1.95583.
Table A2b: Original sample
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A.3 Regression Results
Model 1 2 3 4
w 0.403∗∗ 0.360∗ 0.322 0.330
(0.175) (0.190) (0.198) (0.211)
w(t-1) 0.064 0.066 -0.002
(0.042) (0.043) (0.056)
pi 0.077∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.047∗
(0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
pi∗CENT -0.079∗∗ -0.073∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
pi∗DECENT -0.092∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.065∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038)
pi(t-1) 0.023 0.034
(0.025) (0.035)
pi∗CENT(t-1) -0.011 -0.028
(0.021) (0.028)
pi∗DECENT(t-1) -0.016 -0.018
(0.022) (0.035)
pi(t-2) 0.043∗
(0.024)
pi∗CENT(t-2) -0.047∗
(0.024)
pi∗DECENT(t-2) -0.036
(0.028)
pi = −pi∗CENT 0.908 0.586 0.321 0.429
(p−value)
pi = −pi∗DECENT 0.586 0.504 0.415 0.481
(p−value)
∗Significant at 10%-level,∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
Table A3: Differenced GMM regression results
... to be continued on next page
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... continue Table A3
Model 1 2 3 4
HIGHSHARE -12.835∗∗ -9.038∗ -8.310 -11.834
(5.133) (5.346) (5.140) (6.927)
BLUESHARE -1.280 2.578 2.379 5.706
(2.568) (3.098) (3.003) (3.549)
APPSHARE -1.818 8.088 6.258 11.176
(11.414) (13.274) (13.294) (16.319)
FEMSHARE -1.834 -5.925 -5.832 -6.503
(8.722) (9.083) (8.933) (10.561)
SIZE -0.001 -3.0e−04 -7.0e−04 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
SIZE2 -1.92e−08 -1.61e−08 -6.34e−09 -1.30e−08
(2.98e−08) (2.96e−08) (3.20e−08) (4.55e−08)
CENT 3.652∗∗ 3.694∗∗ 3.863∗∗ 3.252∗
(1.809) (1.723) (1.672) (1.665)
DECENT 4.179∗∗ 3.981∗ 3.783∗ 2.794
(2.020) (2.074) (2.041) (1.994)
WCOUNCIL -1.702 -2.243 -2.490 -1.043
(2.080) (2.125) (2.108) (2.618)
K/L -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(4.0e−04) (3.0e−04) (3.0e−04) (3.0e−04)
Sargan/Hansen 0.288 0.463 0.604 0.443
(p−value)
AR(2) (p−value) 0.932 0.460 0.688 0.401
Establishments 661 661 661 661
Observations 2,750 2,089 2,089 1,428
Note: The dependent variable is the aggregate per-capita wage bill. All
variables are first-differenced. Results are reported for one-step differenced
GMM estimators. All specifications include time dummies.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗Significant at 10%-level,∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
Table A3: Differenced GMM regression results
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Model 1 2 3 4
w 0.386∗∗ 0.374∗∗ 0.323∗∗ 0.367∗
(0.156) (0.149) (0.161) (0.197)
w(t-1) 0.221∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.051)
pi 0.084∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.044
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
pi∗CENT -0.070∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.053∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
pi∗DECENT -0.062∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.053
(0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.035)
pi(t-1) 0.007 0.006
(0.016) (0.019)
pi∗CENT(t-1) 0.014 0.011
(0.013) (0.016)
pi∗DECENT(t-1) 0.006 0.024
(0.015) (0.020)
pi(t-2) 0.019
(0.014)
pi∗CENT(t-2) -0.023
(0.016)
pi∗DECENT(t-2) -0.004
(0.019)
pi = -pi∗CENT 0.267 0.739 0.389 0.535
(p−value)
pi = -pi∗DECENT 0.204 0.483 0.906 0.689
(p−value)
∗Significant at 10%-level,∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
Table A4: SYS-GMM regression results
... to be continued on next page
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... continue Table A4
Model 1 2 3 4
HIGHSHARE -7.306 -5.846 -4.884 -3.073
(4.756) (4.976) (4.867) (5.935)
BLUESHARE 3.618 6.267∗ 6.140∗ 11.751∗∗
(2.990) (3.606) (3.537) (4.647)
APPSHARE -10.914 -7.663 -8.394 3.351
(11.145) (11.573) (11.883) (19.267)
FEMSHARE -4.603 -5.326 -4.706 -4.775
(4.929) (4.720) (4.688) (5.291)
SIZE 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(7.0e−04) (7.0e−04) (7.0e−04) (8.0e−04)
SIZE2 -2.69e−08∗ -2.22e−08 -2.28e−08 -2.80e−08
(1.46e−08) 1.44e−08 (1.49e−08) (1.76e−08)
CENT 4.850∗∗∗ 4.809∗∗∗ 5.279∗∗∗ 3.710∗
(1.861) (1.856) (1.818) (2.066)
DECENT 3.258∗∗ 3.613∗∗ 3.498∗∗ 4.276∗
(1.636) (1.627) (1.690) (2.479)
WCOUNCIL 6.210∗∗ 3.882 3.841 4.250
(2.633) (2.392) (2.395) (2.796)
K/L 3.67e−06 -2.0e−04 -1.0e−04 -3.0e−04
(1.0e−04) (2.0e−04) (2.0e−04) (2.0e−04)
Sargan/Hansen 0.312 0.346 0.312 0.318
(p−value)
Diff. Test comp. to 0.484 0.220 0.056 0.184
Table A2 (p−value)
AR(2) (p−value) 0.713 0.128 0.204 0.118
Establishments 661 661 661 661
Observations 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,089
Note: The dependent variable is the aggregate per-capita wage bill. Results
are reported for one-step SYS-GMM estimators. All specifications include
time dummies, 15 industry dummies as well as an east-west and an ownership
dummy. All endogenous and predetermined variables are assumed to be
correlated with the establishment-specific effect.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗Significant at 10%-level,∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
Table A4: SYS-GMM regression results
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CENT DECENT NO-COVERAGE
OLS Selectivity OLS Selectivity OLS Selectivity
corrected corrected corrected
pi 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
w 0.547∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.072) (0.157) (0.157) (0.066) (0.083)
HIGHSHARE 17.996∗∗∗ 15.715∗∗∗ 14.622∗∗∗ 16.117∗∗∗ 14.544∗∗∗ 14.284∗∗∗
(1.923) (1.953) (4.487) (4.442) (2.064) (2.482)
BLUESHARE 4.944∗∗∗ 4.485∗∗∗ 5.259∗∗ 3.696 6.433∗∗∗ 6.306∗∗∗
(1.174) (1.247) (2.183) (2.524) (1.076) (1.261)
APPSHARE 1.562 -1.451 8.141 11.216 -6.885∗ -7.050∗∗
(4.007) (4.541) (9.067) (11.931) (3.638) (3.447)
FEMSHARE -19.017∗∗∗ -17.510∗∗∗ -14.397∗∗∗ -15.159∗∗∗ -12.565∗∗∗ -12.291∗∗∗
(1.327) (1.447) (2.924) (2.995) (1.184) (1.670)
SIZE 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(3.00e−04) (3.00e−04) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
SIZE2 -2.60e−08∗∗ -1.92e−08 -4.10e−08 -6.90e−08 -8.81e−06∗∗∗ -8.79e−06∗∗∗
(1.07e−08) (1.29e−08) (8.74e−08) (2.24e−07) (2.06e−06) (2.38e−06)
WCOUNCIL 8.491∗∗∗ 5.455∗∗∗ 7.470∗∗∗ 4.141∗∗ 3.256∗∗∗ 2.763
(0.595) (1.075) (1.092) (2.017) (0.672) (2.344)
K/L 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 6.28e−05 -0.0004∗∗ 2.00e−04 2.00e−04
(7.00e−04) (7.00e−04) (1.10e−04) (3.00e−04) (8.00e−04) (8.00e−04)
OWN -4.442∗∗∗ -4.825∗∗∗ -4.720∗∗∗ -4.064∗∗ -6.524∗∗∗ -6.598∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.622) (1.334) (1.345) (0.511) (0.698)
EAST -3.194∗∗∗ 0.206 -3.588 -5.487∗∗ -8.713∗∗∗ -8.308∗∗∗
(1.009) (1.431) (2.240) (2.253) (1.020) (2.165)
Intercept 8.036∗∗∗ 8.752∗ 5.050 21.610∗ 24.197∗∗∗ 22.453∗∗
(3.746) (4.784) (9.511) (11.367) (4.844) (10.394)
λj(θj·z′) -6.124∗∗∗ -9.569∗∗∗ 0.781
(1.814) (3.388) (3.531)
Ind.-/Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,725 4,725 892 892 2,970 2,970
Note: The dependent variable is the aggregate per-capita wage bill. Heteroscedasticity-robust
(POLS) and bootstrapped standard errors (selectivity corrected results - 100 repetitions)
are in parentheses. All models include time dummies and 15 industry dummies.
∗Significant at 10%-level ∗∗ Significant at 5%-level ∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level
Table A5: Selectivity corrected regression results
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